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1 Introduction 
Our capability to perform tasks such as remembering to keep an appointment, pay 
bills in time, or turn off the stove after cooking is of fundamental importance in the 
attainment and preservation of autonomy in everyday life across the lifespan. Performing 
such tasks depends, to a large extent, on our ability to remember what we planned to do at a 
specific moment in the future. In general, the term prospective memory is used to describe 
this type of task as well as the processes by which we succeed or fail in carrying out such 
tasks. Because the successful completion of prospective memory tasks involves a variety of 
processes such as memory, attention, action control, and motivation (e.g., Dobbs & Reeves, 
1996; Winograd, 1988) some authors prefer the term realizing delayed intentions instead of 
prospective memory (e.g., Ellis, 1996; Ellis & Freeman, 2008). The term delayed intention 
highlights two important aspects of prospective memory. First, there must be an intention, 
which means that a person has decided to act as a result of voluntary processes. Second, the 
intention cannot be executed immediately, but its execution has to be postponed until some 
designated moment in the future. This implies that the intended activity (e.g., to return the 
library book) is associated with a more or less well-defined retrieval situation (e.g., en route 
home after work). What distinguishes prospective memory tasks from retrospective memory 
tasks is “that they require identifying or recognizing cues as telltale signs of previously 
formed plans and intentions when they (the cues) occur as part of ongoing thoughts, actions, 
or situations.” (Graf & Uttl, 2001, p. 442). Consequently, a question of fundamental 
importance is what brings a representation of intention into one’s mind at the right moment 
given that there are no explicit prompts to initiate the retrieval.  
Before turning to possible mechanisms that may contribute to successful remembering 
of an intended activity at an appropriate moment in the future, we will shortly present some 
definitions of the term intention (as used in the prospective memory literature). As McDaniel 
and Einstein (2007) put it in their attempt to define a prospective memory task “[t]here must 
be an intention” (p. 8). In other words, an intention is an inherent property of all prospective 
memory tasks. Like needs and goals, intentions are motivational states. Most researcher argue 
that what distinguishes intentions from other motivational states is that they involve the 
(conscious) formation of a plan. For example, Goschke and Kuhl (1996) characterize 
intentions as cases in which “the individual is committed to the execution of a particular 
course of action (as opposed to merely wishing or desiring a goal state)” (p. 55). Following 
Smith (2008) the basic element of an intention is an intent, that is, the conscious decision to 
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act in a certain way as a result of volitional processes. She defines an intent as a mental 
representation of the agent and the action, for example “I return the library book”. She 
distinguishes intentional and nonintentional intents. The latter refers to reflexive action-
trigger schema (e.g., to pick up the receiver when the phone rings), whereas the former 
requires that a plan of acting was formed before the action was executed. She proposes to use 
the term intention to refer to previously planned actions (i.e., intentional intents). A key 
feature of both definitions of intention is that an individual has decided on and is committed 
to a certain course of action. In contrast, Kvavilashvili and Ellis (1996) define an intention as 
“a person’s readiness to act in a certain way in the future, where what has to be done and 
when it has to be done are defined with more or less clarity” (p. 26). As Ellis (1996) further 
elaborates an individual’s readiness to act may depend on the motivational status of an 
intention, varying from whishes to wants and musts. Thus, the latter definition takes a 
broader perspective on what might be considered an intention. In the current research we 
adopted a restrictive definition of intentions: All participants were obligated to act in a 
particular way. To strengthen their commitment to fulfil those experimenter-defined 
intentions properly, we usually announced an evaluation of their accomplishment at the 
intended activity. In other words, the motivational status of the intention was a “must” (but 
see Experiment 3 for an exception). The implications of our findings for these different views 
of intentions are elaborated in the Final Discussion. 
It is commonly acknowledged that prospective memory proceeds through the 
following phases: encoding, retention, retrieval, execution, and output evaluation. Following 
Ellis’ (1996) conceptual framework during the encoding phase, three components and the 
associations among them are encoded: action, cue, and intent. The action-component refers to 
information related with the activity that one has planned to perform at a retrieval occasion. 
Sometimes it refers to physical actions (e.g., to return a library book), but other intentions 
may be described as more verbal (e.g., to tell a colleague who has called during her absence). 
The cue component describes an appropriate retrieval occasion that may be event based, such 
as the occurrence of a particular stimulus (e.g., when seeing Linda), time based, related to a 
particular time (at 2 p.m.) or when a time interval has elapsed (after 20 minutes), or activity 
based, that is, related to the beginning or end of another task (after breakfast). Naturally 
occurring intentions are often a mixture of different kinds of retrieval occassions. Finally, the 
intent component refers to the motivational status of an intention. As mentioned above, most 
researcher restrict the term intent[ion] to prospective memory tasks, in which individuals 
have decided to act in a particular way (e.g., Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; McDaniel & Einstein, 
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2007; Smith, 2008), whereas Ellis (1996; Ellis & Freeman, 2008; Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 
1996) adopts a broader definition including whishes, wants, and musts.  
After encoding the intention must be delayed until an appropriate retrieval occasion  
occurs. This delay interval is filled with other activities and the intention is out of conscious 
awareness for most of the time (e.g., Graf & Uttl, 2001). Ellis (1996) distinguishes two kinds 
of delay intervals: a retention interval and a performance interval. The term retention interval 
refers to activities unrelated with a retrieval occassion, whereas performance interval refers to 
the time window during which an occasion to execute the intention might occur. For 
example, if one formed the intention to stop on one’s way home at the local supermarket to 
buy milk, the retention interval is the period between encoding of the intention and the 
moment one heads for home after work. En route home a retrieval occasion arrives each time 
one passes a supermarket. The latter period describes the performance interval. We will come 
back to the distinction of retention and performance interval in the Final Discussion.  
Successful prospective memory requires that a previously more or less well-specified 
retrieval occasion (e.g., passing the supermarket) is detected as an intention-relevant situation 
(e.g., today one has the intention to buy something). In other words, if a situation maps a 
previously specified retrieval cue the intent to do something as well as the associated action 
must be retrieved. As a consequence of retrieval, the intended activity is executed and the 
consequences of intention execution are evaluated.  
Different underlying mechanisms of successful intention retrieval have been 
discussed in the literature. One possible mechanism is that intention-related information is 
represented at a higher level of accessibility than other long-term memory contents. Since 
there are no explicit prompts to initiate the retrieval of delayed intentions, a heightened 
accessibility of intention-related information would be adaptive. Lewin (1926) suggested that 
there is an internal task-tension which presses to carry out the intention and that this tension 
exists over long periods of time until the goal has been attained. The state of tension arises 
from the act of intending. Thus, whether a concept enjoys a special storage status in memory 
depends on the intentional status of this information. This assumption is also reflected in 
Ellis’ (1996) framework. The author suggested that the above mentioned action- and cue 
component are represented as action-trigger schema. The intent is interpreted as an additional 
source of activation that increases the baseline level of activation of a particular action-trigger 
schema. Thus, again the intentional status determines the accessibility of an activity or related 
information.   
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There is some indirect evidence for the assumption of a special status of intentions 
from research on everyday intentions. For example, Freeman and Ellis (2003a) asked 
participants to list all activities they were planning to fulfil over the following week. One 
week later participants were asked to list all planned activities they had carried out over the 
last week. Student participants generated intended activities more fluently than fulfilled 
activities. Further analyses indicated that participants tended to forget to recall previously 
listed intended activities rather than forgot to generate intended activities at the first session 
(see also Maylor, Darby, & Sala, 2000, for a similar result for a student population). 
Zeigarnik (1927) reported a similar recall advantage for uncompleted (interrupted) 
laboratory-based tasks relative to completed tasks (e.g., Butterfield, 1964, for a critical 
review of the Zeigarnik effect). In sum, uncompleted or intended activities seem more easily 
accessible than completed ones in terms of higher recall rates.  
A more direct approach to test the assumption of a heightened accessibility of 
intention-related information was taken by Goschke and Kuhl (1993). In a set of four 
experiments they demonstrated faster recognition latencies for actions participants intended 
to carry out after the recognition test compared to intention-irrelevant actions. They labelled 
this reaction-time advantage for near-term intentions as intention-superiority effect. The 
authors  attributed the reaction-time advantage for some actions to the intentional status of 
those materials (see also Goschke & Kuhl, 1996, for details). They proposed that if an 
activity receives the status of an intention (i.e. if an individual is committed to performing a 
denoted activity), action-related information is more easily accessible until the activity is 
executed. Supporting this view Marsh, Hicks and Bink (1998) demonstrated an intention-
superiority effect for interrupted (i.e., still intention-relevant) action scripts in a lexical-
decision task. Interestingly, there was no difference in latencies between already completed 
and intended actions of the interrupted script. In this study it seemed that as long as the script 
was associated with an intention, all related action steps were more easily accessible. In 
addition, the reaction-time advantage for intention-relevant information seems to vanish or 
even reverse into a reaction-time disavantage for cancelled (Marsh, Hicks, & Bryan, 1999) or 
completed activities (Marsh, et al., 1998; ; but see Penningroth, 2011, for an exception). 
Taken together, the intentional status of actions seems crucial for demonstrating an intention-
superiority effect.  
Goschke and Kuhl’s (1993, 1996) proposition that the intention-superiority effect 
reflects the intentional status of the to-be-performed actions has been criticized by different 
authors. In an alternative account, Freeman and Ellis (2003b; Ellis & Freeman, 2008) argued 
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that actions intended for future enactment are functionally similar to  actions enacted at 
encoding. According to this reasoning, the encoding of well-defined intentions such as 
“setting a table” entails a multimodal representations of the task which enhances memory 
similar to an enactment effect (e.g., Engelkamp, 1998, for a review on the enactment effect). 
Thus, a heightened accessibility of intentions may reflect a rich encoding rather than some 
special status due to the intention. We will elaborate on this view in the Final Discussion. At 
present, we may conclude that both explanations focus on specific properties of the 
representation of intentions: the intentional status or motor-code information. Thus, in these 
authors’ views, the intention-superiority effect is a phenomenon of encoding. 
Another line of research focuses on the role of attentional resources in the retrieval of 
an intention. Successful prospective remembering, during a performance interval, relies on 
detecting and recognizing a situation as a cue for an planned activity and retrieving (and 
executing) that activity. There is some debate whether the detection of a retrieval occasion 
requires attentional resources. The most elaborated models concentrate on event-based 
intentions. According to the multiprocess model, event-based cue detection will be 
spontaneous when certain conditions are met: when the cue is salient, when the cue is highly 
associated with the action, and/or when the ongoing task focuses attention on the relevant 
features of the cue (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007). 
Otherwise, cue detection can require attentional resources. Whether individuals rely on 
spontaneous or attentional-demanding strategic processes depends on characteristics of the 
prospective memory tasks, the nature of the ongoing tasks in which a retrieval occasion is 
embedded, and characteristics of the individual undertaking the task. In contrast, Smith 
(2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004) proposed in her preparatory attentional and memory process 
(PAM) model that resource-demanding preparatory processes are obligatory for successful 
event-based prospective memory performance. Smith (2003) introduced a new method that 
examined “costs” of prospective memory tasks on the performance of an ongoing activity in 
which a retrieval cue was embedded. In this research response latencies and accuracy for 
intention-irrelevant stimuli in an ongoing task with a prospective memory task are contrasted 
with ongoing task performance when the prospective memory task is absent or postponed 
until after the ongoing task. She reasoned that if limited attentional resources are devoted to 
some degree to the preparation of  the prospective task and away from the processing of the 
ongoing activity, this should reflect in slowing latencies of the ongoing activity. Holding an 
intention should interfere with processing of the ongoing activity. In line with this reasoning 
Smith (2003) reported slower response latencies if an event-based prospective memory task 
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was embedded in the ongoing activity relative to a no-intention condition and slowing 
latencies were associated with better prospective memory performance. Subsequent research, 
however, found no task interference costs if the prospective task met the conditions described 
by the multiprocess model for spontaneous retrieval detection (e.g., A.-L. Cohen, Jaudas, & 
Gollwitzer, 2008; Einstein, et al., 2005). Such null findings are more consistent with a 
multiprocess view than the PAM model that assumes obligatory attention-demanding 
processes (cf. Kliegel, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2008, for a detailed discussion of task 
interference effects in prospective memory). 
The current research was not conducted to adjucate between the PAM and the 
multiprocess model. Yet, we think there might be some interesting parallels between 
observed task interference costs in the ongoing activity and the intention-superiority effect 
introduced by Goschke and Kuhl (1993). Both phenomena might be two sides of the same 
coin. The successful detection of a retrieval cue implies that the representation of the 
intention is activated to a certain degree. A supermarket only is a relevant retrieval cue to buy 
milk if one has previously formed the intention to buy milk. It seems reasonable to assume 
that next to information related to the retrieval cue, other information related to the intention, 
for example the intended action of buying milk, is also more activated. The intention-
superiority effect may reflect a biased allocation of attentional resources towards information 
related to the intention (e.g., the action component). A slowing in the ongoing activity may 
reflect the flipside of this allocation policy. We will return to this idea in the Final 
Discussion.  
1.1 Outline of the present research 
As Ellis and Freeman (2008) concluded in their work on the intention-superiority 
effect “[t]hus far cognitive psychologists have focused primarily on the action component of 
an intention, with some work on the cue component, but scant regard to the intent (strength of 
decision to act, including will or commitment)” (p. 22). The current research consists of two 
series of experiments, related to the thus far rather neglected intent  and the cue component, 
respectively. In a first series we focused on the role of the intent. Specifically, previous 
research on the intention-superiority effect reported faster latencies for reactions to stimuli 
intended for future enactment relative to stimuli associated with no enactment or cancelled 
enactment. Previous attempts to demonstrate an intention-superiority effect for other types of 
tasks, for instance observing the experimenter executing actions, have not yielded an 
intention-superiority effect. A reason for this could be that the typical enactment task was 
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associated with a higher degree of commitment than other laboratory-based tasks, and that 
task importance or its consequences heighten the accessibility of intention-relevant materials. 
In the three experiments described in Chapter 2 we investigated whether an intention-
superiority effect can be found for different types of tasks (e.g., grading a verbal report) when 
task realization has personally relevant consequences in terms of a performance evaluation.  
In a second series of experiments we focused on the cue component. Goschke and 
Kuhl (1993) interpreted the intention-superiority effect in terms of a more persistent 
activation of intention-related materials. However, persistency of activation and proximity of 
retrieval opportunity have not been disentangled yet. Typically participants are instructed to 
realize the intention immediately after completing the task that assesses response latencies 
(e.g. a recognition test) and yields the intention-superiority effect. Thus, the response-latency 
task is also associated with a retrieval occasion in the near future. Three experiments in 
Chapter 3 tested whether the proximity of a retrieval opportunity affects the intention-
superiority effect.  
In each chapter the immediate implications of the presented findings are discussed. A 
Final Discussion chapter relates the findings to each other and to this introduction.     
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2 Do Personally Relevant Consequences Determine 
Activation? 
Prospective memory refers to the ability to realize an intended task at an appropriate 
moment in the future. A key feature of prospective memory tasks such as remembering to 
pass on a message to a colleague when seeing her, buying milk on one’s way home, or 
attending the yearly routine check at the dentist is that task execution is postponed for hours, 
days, or even weeks or months. During postponement a representation of the intended task 
must be retained until appropriate opportunity to fulfil the task occurs (e.g., Ellis, 1996). 
Previous research has found that stimuli describing the actions intended for future enactment 
remain activated during postponement. The aim of the present research was testing whether 
this finding is more general, extending to all intention-relevant information, be they related to 
the execution of actions or not.  
In 1993, Goschke and Kuhl introduced a paradigm to examine the accessibility of 
intention-relevant materials during postponement. Participants learned two short lists of 
actions (for example, ‘setting a dinner table’ and ‘clearing a messy desk’) for a later 
recognition test. After the study phase, they were informed that they should carry out the 
actions of one list (prospective list), but not of the other list (neutral list) after a recognition 
test for both lists. In the recognition test, response latencies for verbs and nouns of the 
prospective list were faster than latencies for stimuli of the neutral list. The authors labelled 
this reaction-time advantage for stimuli related to the intended actions intention-superiority 
effect. This effect has been replicated with a more direct measure of accessibility, a lexical 
decision task (Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, et al., 1999; Penningroth, 2011), and in a more 
naturalistic setting (Dockree & Ellis, 2001). 
Different mechanisms underlying the intention-superiority effect have been discussed. 
For example, Goschke and Kuhl (1993, 1996) suggested that intentions are represented as 
subthreshold nodes in long-term memory that decay more slowly than more neutral contents. 
According to that view, a heightened accessibility of intention-related concepts is an intrinsic 
property of the representation of the intention. Alternatively, Freeman and Ellis (2003b) 
proposed that motor or sensorimotor information associated with the future execution of 
actions is stored with the representation of the intention. Thus the intention-superiority effect 
might be due to a rich multimodal representation of intentions compared to verbal 
representations (e.g., Koriat, Ben-Zur, & Nussbaum, 1990, for a similar reasoning). Finally, 
intentions are related to motivational states and thus the strength or value of the intention may 
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determine the accessibility of intention-related concepts (e.g., Förster, Liberman, & 
Friedman, 2007; Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005). Thus, the intention-superiority effect 
could reflect the participant’s degree of commitment to realize the intention. The role of 
motivation-related processes remains an open question in studies on the intention-superiority 
effect in a postponed-intention paradigm. 
The existing studies suggest that the intention-superiority effect is restricted to one 
type of task: the future enactment of the learned actions. Stimuli of the prospective list were 
faster responded to than stimuli of the neutral list if participants intended to carry out the 
actions of the prospective list after the assessment of response latencies (Dockree & Ellis, 
2001; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, et al., 1999; Penningroth, 2011). If 
participants, however, intended to observe the experimenter executing the actions (Goschke 
& Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998) or if they were asked to verbally recall the actions 
(Freeman & Ellis, 2003b), response latencies were comparable for stimuli of the prospective 
and the neutral list. In order to explain this pattern of findings, we suggest that the types of 
laboratory-based tasks differed with regard to the degree of commitment to realize the 
intention. In particular, we assume that the future enactment task was associated with a 
higher degree of personal relevance for the participants compared to an observation task or 
verbal recall. Thus the intention-superiority effect for future enactment might reflect a higher 
motivation to fulfil the denoted task rather than the multimodal representation of the intention 
that Freeman and Ellis (2003b, see previous paragraph) postulated. There are hints for this in 
the previous studies. 
In studies comparing an enactment and an observation task (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 
Marsh, et al., 1998), the incentive to fulfil the enactment task properly was higher than that to 
fulfil the observation task. For the enactment task, task requirements were clearly defined 
(enact a list of specified actions) and task realization resulted in an observable outcome that 
could be evaluated by the experimenter (e.g., how many or in which order actions were 
performed). In addition, failing to perform a short, well-known script such as ‘setting a dinner 
table’ in the presence of the experimenter might be perceived as embarrassing. Although an 
evaluation of participants’ performance was not explicitly announced, participants were 
replaced who did not perform all actions (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) or who enacted the list in 
the wrong order (Marsh, et al., 1998). In the respective observation condition, participants 
were instructed to watch the experimenter and register mistakes (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) or 
to verify whether the experimenter performed the correct list of actions (Marsh, et al., 1998). 
Whether they did monitor the experimenter attentively was not reported. Thus participants 
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could faithfully fulfil the instructions, but in contrast to the enactment task they did not have 
to. No participant was replaced in the observation condition due to task failure. Consequences 
such as an evaluation of one’s monitoring performance were also rather unlikely since task 
requirements were only vaguely defined. In short, the public outcome as well as an 
anticipated evaluation of one’s enactment performance may have strengthened the motivation 
to fulfil the enactment task properly compared to the observation task.  
A similar reasoning applies to potential differences in motivation in Freeman and 
Ellis’ (2003b) research. Participants were asked to either to pantomimically enact a list of 
verbs or to orally recall them. Thus, for both types of tasks, task requirements were clear and 
the quality of task performance was evaluated in terms of recall performance. Yet, the idea of 
having to recall verbs such as “to eat” or “to grasp” by bodily or facial movements in the 
presence of the experimenter could be perceived as more unpleasant or embarrassing than 
verbally recalling them (e.g., Saltz, 1988). Again, this may result in an increased effort to 
encode or store stimuli related to the more unpleasant future enactment task, which could 
imply these stimuli are more easily accessible during postponement than those intended for 
verbal recall.  
To sum up, prior studies have demonstrated faster latencies for intention-related 
materials relative to more neutral materials during postponement if materials were to be 
enacted (usually in the presence of an experimenter). We propose that the anticipated 
evaluation of one’s enactment has strengthened the motivation to fulfil the enactment task 
properly compared to other tasks. Assuming that the strength of motivation increases the 
accessibility of intention-related concepts, one would expect an intention-superiority effect 
for more relevant tasks (such as the previously used enactment task) and the intention-
superiority effect should be less pronounced for less relevant tasks (for example the 
previously used observation task). 
2.1 Experiment 1 
The primary aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether an intention-superiority effect 
could be demonstrated in a monitoring task if this task was personally relevant for 
participants. The general procedure was similar to that of Dockree and Ellis (2001): 
Participants studied two lists of actions for future tasks. Later one list was cancelled and the 
other list remained relevant for the intended task. Prior to realisation of the intended task, 
response latencies for stimuli of the prospective list and the cancelled list were assessed. 
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We used two types of intended tasks. Participants were asked to enact one list of 
actions and to monitor a videotaped performance of the other list of actions. Similar to 
Goschke and Kuhl’s (1993) observation task participants were instructed to register mistakes 
and to judge the quality of the observed enactment performance. To strengthen the personal 
relevance of the monitoring task, participants were informed that they had to discuss their 
judgement with other participants. Being able to give an explanation for one’s judgement 
(e.g., it was a poor performance because several actions were omitted) requires that the 
videotaped performance was monitored attentively. A public response should strengthen the 
commitment to fulfil the intended task (e.g., Meacham, 1988). For the enactment task, 
participants expected to pantomimically enact one list of actions and being judged by other 
participants. We assume that participants perceive the typical prospective enactment task as a 
personally relevant evaluation situation. Consequently, an explicit feedback announcement 
should be of small impact for an enactment task. If motor information were crucial one would 
expect an intention-superiority effect in the enactment task, but not in the observation task. If, 
however, strength of motivation contributes to a heightened accessibility of intention-related 
materials, then there should be an intention-superiority effect for both types of task, that is, 
enactment and monitoring. In line with previous research, we also expected that stimuli of 
both lists would be more easily accessible than new distracter stimuli because they had been 
encountered previously during the study phase (e.g., Dockree & Ellis, 2001; Marsh, et al., 
1998; Marsh, et al., 1999) 
In addition, we assessed one motivational aspect that could differ between enactment 
and monitoring task and/or affect the size of the intention-superiority effect: negative feelings 
concerning task execution. The idea of having to enact a list simple actions in the presence of 
others could be more unpleasant or embarrassing than monitoring someone’s enactment (e.g., 
Arar, Nilsson, & Molander, 1993). This may result in increased effort to encode and store the 
elements of the intended task, which means that stimuli related to the more unpleasant task 
are more easily accessible during postponement. Thus, the intention-superiority effect could 
be more pronounced for the enactment task than for the observation task. Further we assessed 
negative feelings concerning the evaluation of one’s performance. We did not expect 
differences between both types of tasks. Whether one’s ability to enact a list of actions or 
one’s ability to monitor someone else’s performance is discussed with others should be of 
little impact. However, participants who regard an evaluation as rather embarrassing could 
try harder to encode or store intention-related materials. Consequently, the intention-
superiority effect may be more pronounced for these participants. To control for these factors 
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we assessed how unpleasant, stressful, and embarrassing participants expected the task 
realization per se to be as well as the succeeding outcome evaluation.  
2.1.1 Method 
2.1.1.1 Participants  
Fifty-two undergraduates volunteered in exchange for course credit (age: 19 – 31 
years, M = 22, SD = 3; 85% women). Six students were replaced due to language problems or 
task comprehension failures. Twenty-three participants were randomly assigned to each task 
condition. 
2.1.1.2 Materials  
Three lists describing simple actions (mixing a cocktail, preparing chocolate candy, 
and cooking a sushi dish) were generated. Lists were modelled after Goschke and Kuhl 
(1993). Each list consisted of a title and four typical actions (materials can be found in 
Appendix A). The lists were grouped into three pairs (cocktail – candy, cocktail – sushi, 
candy – sushi) that formed study materials. Lists were counterbalanced across participants.  
The lexical-decision task (LDT) included words from the two study lists, distracter 
words, and nonwords. Four nouns and four verbs were chosen from each study list, for 
example mixing a cocktail and preparing chocolate candy. Distracter words comprised the 
nouns and verbs of the third, unlearned list, in the latter example cooking a sushi dish, and 
eight other words (four nouns, four verbs). Words did not differ in word length or word 
frequency. Nonwords consisted of 32 pronounceable letter strings that were matched in word 
length with words. Half of the nonwords had typical German verb endings (e.g. –ieren). A 
further 12 stimuli (six words, six nonwords) were used as buffer items that preceded the 
critical lexical-decision trials. The critical trials were presented in a random order with the 
restriction that half of each type of item was presented in the first or second half of the LDT.  
Feelings about the task realization as well as the succeeding performance discussion 
were assessed on separate scales. Both situations, task realization itself and discussion of 
one’s performance, were rated on three items (unpleasant, stressful, embarrassing) on a 7-
point-scale (1 “very much”; 7 “not at all”).  
2.1.1.3 Procedure  
Participants were tested in groups of two to four. They were told they were going to 
learn two lists of actions for two future tasks. One task would be the pantomimic enactment 
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of a list of actions, the other task would be to monitor and judge a videotaped pantomimic 
performance of the other list of actions. After each task a discussion of task performance with 
other participants was expected. We stated that our primary interest was the quality of their 
statements in the discussion, for example whether they could give reasons for their judgement 
of someone else’s performance. Instructions were given in written form and were reiterated 
by the experimenter. Then the LDT was introduced as computer task and practiced for eight 
trials.  
Next participants studied two lists of actions (e.g., mixing a cocktail and preparing 
chocolate candy). The two study lists were given on separate sheets. All participants at one 
test session received the same two lists, but the order of lists was randomized for each 
participant. Study time was restricted to 1.5 min and the experimenter informed participants 
about the remaining study time every 30 seconds. The lists were then removed. A pre-test had 
shown that study time was sufficient to learn both lists. During the study phase, participants 
expected that both lists are important for future tasks, but they did not know which list would 
be combined with what task. The encoding of a particular list for a specific task is therefore 
unlikely.  
In order to stress the experimental set-up and as a delay between list learning and 
retrieval, the experimenter initiated a get-to-know-each-other that lasted about five minutes. 
Then the experimenter cancelled one task (e.g., enactment) and one list (e.g., mixing a 
cocktail) due to time constraints. The other task (e.g., monitoring a videotape) and the second 
learned list (e.g., preparing chocolate candy) remained intention-relevant. The wording was 
modelled after Dockree and Ellis (2001), in the enactment condition: “The get-to-know-each-
other lasted relatively long. Because of time constraints, you are to carry out only one task: 
Pantomimic enactment. You no longer are to monitor [List A], but only pantomime [List B]. 
Please attend the computer task, while I prepare everything.” Instructions for the monitoring 
condition were: “The get-to-know-each-other lasted relatively long. Because of time 
constraints, you are to carry out only one task: Monitoring a video clip. You no longer are to 
pantomime [List A], but only monitor [List B]. Please attend the computer task, while I 
prepare everything.” The assignment of prospective and cancelled list was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
After finishing the computer task (the LDT), participants expected to have to realize 
the intended task. Yet, the experimenter gave them several sheets of paper. First, they were 
asked to write down which task they were going to realize (enactment or monitoring) as a 
manipulation check. Second, they rated how unpleasant, stressful, and embarrassing the 
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anticipated task realization (e.g., monitoring) would be. Third, an unexpected free recall for 
both lists was given. Participants were instructed to write down “all actions of the list you 
have to [pantomime/monitor]”, then “all actions of the second list you learned”. Recall time 
was restricted to 1 min for each list. Participants who either indicated the wrong task in the 
manipulation check or wrote down the wrong list first (i.e., the list associated with the 
cancelled task), were replaced.  
After recall, participants were informed that they did not have to perform the intended 
task and consequently, there was no group-based discussion.1 Still, they rated how 
unpleasant, stressful and embarrassing a discussion of their performance would have been. 
Additionally, the importance of the intended task (“A good performance at the task is … 1 
“not at all important” – 7 “very important”) and demographic data (age, sex, nationality) 
were assessed in a short questionnaire. Finally, participants were debriefed and received 
course credit. 
2.1.1.4 Design 
The task (enactment vs. monitor a video clip) was manipulated between subjects. For 
all participants performance in the respective task was relevant because a public discussion of 
one’s performance was expected. The word type (prospective list, cancelled list, distracter) 
was manipulated within subject. Main dependent variables were response latencies in the 
lexical-decision task. In addition, free recall and ratings on both scales concerning feelings 
during task realization as well as feelings concerning performance evaluation were collected. 
2.1.2 Results 
For all statistical analyses, the Type-I-error was set at ! = .05. As an indicator of the 
effect size, partial R2 (R2p) is reported for statistically significant effects (J. Cohen, 1977). 
                                                
1 We reasoned that participants’ intention to realize the task when the LDT is administered is 
more important than the actual realization of the intended task after completing the LDT. 
Therefore free recall for the prospective list is considered as an indicator of task performance. 
For example, participants who recalled all actions would probably also enact all actions or 
register omitted actions in the videotaped performance. In Experiment 2 and 3, all 
participants realized the denoted intended task after free recall. 
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2.1.2.1 Preliminary Analyses  
As a manipulation check we inspected the importance ratings of the task. Participants 
in both groups rated a good performance at the intended tasks as equally important (M = 3.7 
for the enactment task and M = 3.5 for the monitoring task, t < 1). All free recall data were 
analyzed using a liberal scoring criterion: Phrases were counted as correct if original or 
synonymous nouns and verbs were written down. For a successful task realization (enacting 
or monitor a performance), a verbatim recall of the actions would not be necessary and we 
did not instruct participants to recall actions word by word. Most participants (out of 23: 21 
in the enactment task; 22 in the observation task) recalled both lists perfectly. The remaining 
three participants remembered at least three actions of each list. Thus, study time was 
sufficient to learn both lists equally well and any differences in LDT latencies would reflect 
differences in accessibility of intention-relevant versus more neutral information rather than 
differences in memory accuracy. In this and the following experiments the reported pattern of 
results did not change if participants with imperfect recall were excluded.  
2.1.2.2 Lexical-decision Task 
In all experiments, incorrect trials and latencies beyond 3 SDs of each participant’s 
individual mean response were excluded from analyses of lexical decision data, and statistical 
analyses were carried out on log-transformed scores. In Experiment 1, 4.9% of the total 
number of trials were incorrect and 1.6% were outliers.  
As Figure 1 shows reactions to words of the prospective list were faster than reactions 
to words associated with the cancelled list or distracter words for the enactment task as well 
as the monitoring task. A 2 (task) " 3 (word type) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
word type, F(2,88) = 17.17, R2p = .28. Post-hoc (Bonferroni-corrected) t-tests confirmed an 
intention-superiority effect: Words of the prospective list (M = 656 ms) were faster classified 
than words of the previously learned, but cancelled list (M = 720 ms), t(45) = 5.75, R2p = .42. 
As expected, words of the prospective list were also faster classified than new distracter 
words (M = 689 ms), t(45) = 4.14, R2p = .28. In contrast to our expectations, response 
latencies for words of the previously learned, but cancelled list were somewhat slower than 
latencies for previously not encountered distracter words, t(45) = 2.42, R2p = .12, p = .02. 
Neither the main effect of task nor the task " word type interaction was significant, both Fs < 
1. In other words, the type of intended task did not affect the intention-superiority effect. 
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Figure  1. Mean response latencies for words of the prospective list, the cancelled list, and 
distracter words separately for the task of enactment and monitoring a video clip. All 
participants expected an outcome evaluation in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard 
errors of means. 
 
 
2.1.2.3 Ratings 
Participants indicated once how unpleasant, stressful, and embarrassing the 
anticipated task realization (enactment or monitoring) would be, and they rated on the same 
items their feelings concerning the discussion of their performance in this task. Rating scores 
on unpleasantness, stress, and embarrassment about task realization (Cronbach’s ! = .78) and 
about discussion of one’s performance (! = .90) were each summarized. Higher scores 
indicate more negative feelings concerning task realization and performance evaluation, 
respectively. The prospective enactment task (M = 4.1) was rated more negative than 
monitoring a videotape (M = 2.4), t(38) = 4.15. The anticipated evaluation of one’s 
500
600
700
800
900
1000
Enactment Monitor a Video  Clip
652 660
714
727
695
682
Prospective List
Cancelled List
Distracter
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 T
im
e
 (
in
 m
s
)
Task
  
 
17 
performance was rated similarly negative by both groups (M = 3.4 for the enactment task and 
M = 3.2 for the monitoring task, t < 1). However, neither the degree of negative feelings 
concerning the task realization (r < .06) nor feelings about the outcome evaluation (r < .14) 
was related to the size of the intention-superiority effect (cancelled list – prospective list) in 
the lexical-decision task. In other words, whether participants expected the task performance 
to be embarrassing or not, did not affect the size of the intention-superiority effect.  
2.1.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we demonstrated an intention-superiority effect for an enactment task 
as well as a monitoring task. Previous experiments reported comparable latencies for stimuli 
of the prospective and neutral list for a monitoring task (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et 
al., 1998). In these experiments participants were instructed to observe the experimenter’s 
enactment of the prospective list. Our task of monitoring a videotaped performance is very 
similar to such an observation task. In contrast to these experiments our task also required 
some kind of output result (a judgement). In addition, the quality of this output was evaluated 
in public. Participants expected to explain why they judged a performance good or poor. 
Thus, the quality of the monitoring-performance was personally relevant. Similarly, the 
quality of the enactment performance was personally relevant because participants expected a 
feedback from others. The finding of an intention-superiority effect independent of the type 
of task corroborate our hypothesis that the accessibility of intention-related materials may 
depend on motivational aspects, for example outcome evaluation, rather than on a motor 
response during realization. 
We also expected that list words, having been learned only some minutes earlier, 
should be more easily accessible than distracter words. This was true for words of the 
prospective list, but not for words of the cancelled list. The same pattern of results was also 
obtained in the succeeding experiments. We will discuss a possible reason in the General 
Discussion.  
There is a potential limitation of Experiment 1. We told participants that they were 
going to enact one list and observe the other one. We expected that both types of task are 
equally important due to the subsequent discussion of performance. Indeed, the anticipated 
discussion of one’s performance was rated similarly unpleasant for the enactment and the 
observation task. However, ratings concerning the task realization indicate that pantomimic 
enactment was considered more unpleasant than monitoring a videotape. Although 
unpleasantness-ratings did not affect the size of the intention-superiority effect, it might be 
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that participants encoded as a precaution both lists for the more unpleasant task: That is, for 
pantomimic enactment. The reported intention-superiority effect for the monitoring task 
could thus be a covert prospective enactment effect. To exclude this potential criticism we 
used in a second experiment two tasks that required evaluating others’ memory performance. 
Participants either evaluated a written recall test or a videotaped performance. The main job, 
that is, evaluating someone’s performance, was similar for both tasks. A strategic encoding in 
terms of prospective enactment was rather unlikely for these tasks.  
2.2 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was conducted to exclude the potential criticism of activated motor 
representations due to anticipated future enactment of one list. We chose two rather simple 
tasks that draw attention to conceptual information instead of motor information. Participants 
were asked to monitor someone else’s recall and to give a school grade for the recall 
performance. Thus the availability of conceptual information, the content of the list, was 
crucial for task realization, not motor information. We used two types of monitoring tasks 
that only differed concerning the mode of presentation of the to-be-monitored materials: Half 
of the participants expected to monitor a videotaped performance of the prospective list of 
actions (comparable to an observation task in prior studies) and the other half expected to 
monitor a written report of the prospective list. Both tasks required no overt enactment of the 
studied actions, but monitoring the videotaped performance involved observing actions, 
whereas monitoring a written report appeared maximally unrelated to motor enactment. 
Previous studies that used similar materials (that is descriptions of actions) and prospective 
tasks without future enactment have not yielded an intention-superiority effect (Freeman & 
Ellis, 2003b; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998).  
To make sure that task performance (the grading decision) was personally relevant, 
participants were informed that they had to justify their grading decision in the presence of 
other participants. Again, the public task realization should strengthen the commitment to 
fulfil the task proper. If strength of motivation contributes to a heightened accessibility of 
intention-relevant materials, as we assume, then we should observe faster responses to stimuli 
of the intention-relevant prospective list than to stimuli linked with the cancelled list for both 
types of tasks. If the intention-superiority effect is due to the availability of motor 
information, then there should be no reaction-time advantage for intention-related materials 
in the present experiment because the used tasks did not require a future motor response.  
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2.2.1 Method 
2.2.1.1 Participants  
Thirty-three participants were recruited on campus (age: 19 – 37 years, M = 24, SD = 
4; 63% women). They received financial compensation for participation (3 !). One 
participant failed to indicate the correct prospective list and was replaced. Sixteen 
participants were randomly allocated to each task condition.  
2.2.1.2 Materials  
Materials were taken from Experiment 1. Two lists (mixing a cocktail, preparing 
chocolate candy) served as study materials. The lexical-decision task was identical to 
Experiment 1. List words included words from the two study lists. Distracter words consisted 
for all participants of the eight words related to the other, unmentioned list (cooking a sushi 
dish) and eight other words.  
As to-be-monitored materials a video clip as well as a written report of each study list 
was constructed. Materials were incomplete and the order of actions was incoherent, allowing 
flexibility in grading decisions. The errors contained in the video clips and the written reports 
of each list were identical. All materials were prepared for presentation via a video projector. 
A simple yes-no checklist (Was the correct list remembered? Were all actions remembered? 
Were the actions remembered in a correct order?) was prepared to guide grading decisions.  
2.2.1.3 Procedure  
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1. Participants were tested in groups of two 
to four. They were told that we were mainly interested in their ability to evaluate others’ 
memory performance correctly. They were going to learn two lists of actions and later they 
would see a written recall test for one list and a videotaped performance test for the other list. 
Their main job was to give school grades for recall performance in those tests and 
subsequently justify their grading decision. Thus task realization itself (the grading decision) 
was private, but the quality of task performance had relevant consequences (being able to 
give other participants a good reason for one’s decision). Instructions were given in written 
form and were reiterated by the experimenter. Then the LDT was practiced for eight trials.  
Next participants studied both lists for 1.5 min. Lists were then removed and the 
experimenter initiated a get-to-know that lasted about 5 minutes. After the delay the 
experimenter cancelled one task (e.g., monitoring a written report) and one list (e.g., mixing a 
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cocktail) allegedly due to time constraints. The other task (e.g., monitoring a video clip) and 
the other list (e.g., preparing chocolate candy) remained relevant for the prospective task. The 
assignment of prospective and cancelled list was counterbalanced across participants. We 
also counterbalanced the order of prospective and cancelled list (i.e. half of the participants 
were told first what to do and second what not to do, and vice versa). While participants 
worked on the LDT proper, the experimenter prepared a video projector.  
Instead of presenting the to-be-monitored materials immediately after the LDT, 
participants were first asked to write down what they were supposed to do (monitor a video 
clip or a written report) as a manipulation check and memory for both lists was tested in 
unexpected written free recalls. The order of recall tests (prospective list, cancelled list) was 
fixed and recall time restricted to 1 min for each list. In contrast to Experiment 1, participants 
then realized the intended task. The to-be-monitored written report or the respective video 
clip was presented via projector. Participants completed the simple yes-no checklist 
individually and wrote down a school grade for overall memory performance. Afterwards 
they compared and discussed their grading decision with other participants. Finally, they 
completed a short questionnaire including importance of the intended task (1 “not at all 
important”; 7 “very important”) and demographic data and were debriefed. Because the main 
requirements were identical for both tasks, we omitted rating scales concerning feelings 
during task realization and evaluation. 
2.2.1.4 Design  
Independent variables were task (monitor a video clip vs. monitor a written report; 
between subjects) and word type (prospective list, cancelled list, distracter; within subject). 
For all participants performance in the respective task was relevant because a public 
discussion of one’s grading decision was expected. Main dependent variables were response 
latencies in the lexical-decision task. 
2.2.2 Results 
2.2.2.1 Preliminary Analyses  
Participants in both groups rated a good performance at the respective monitoring task 
as equally important (M = 5.2 for the video clip and M = 5.3 for the written report, t < 1). The 
majority (out of 16: 14 for the video clip; 11 for the written report) recalled both lists 
perfectly. The remaining seven participants remembered at least three actions of each list.  
  
 
21 
2.2.2.2 Lexical-decision Task 
Incorrect trials (2.9%) and outliers (1.8%) were removed from lexical-decision data. 
As depicted in Figure 2, again, reactions to words of the prospective list were faster than 
reactions to words associated with the cancelled list or distracter words for both types of  
monitoring task.  A 2 (task) " 3 (word type) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of word 
type, F(2,60) = 6.24, R2p = .17. As expected, there was an intention-superiority effect: Words 
of the prospective list (M = 722 ms) were faster classified than words of the cancelled list (M 
= 763 ms), t(31) = 3.57, R2p = .29. Words of the prospective list were also faster classified 
than new distracter words (M = 746 ms), t(31) = 2.62, R2p =  .18, and response latencies for 
words of the cancelled list and new distracter words did not differ, t < 1. Participants’ overall 
latencies were descriptively faster in the video-clip condition (M = 697 ms) compared to the 
written-report condition (M = 790 ms), but the respective main effect missed the preset 
criterion of statistical significance, F(1,30) = 3.68, R2p = .11, p = .07. More importantly, there 
was no indication of a task " word type interaction, F < 1. 
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Figure  2. Mean response latencies for words of the prospective list, the cancelled list, and 
distracter words separately for the task of monitoring a video clip and monitoring a written 
report. All participants expected an outcome evaluation in Experiment 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors of means. 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 demonstrates an intention-superiority effect for two monitoring tasks 
unrelated to future enactment. For both types of monitoring task, words of the prospective list 
were faster responded to than words of the cancelled list. Previous experiments that used 
actions as study materials, reported comparable latencies for stimuli of the prospective and 
neutral list if participants were instructed to monitor someone’s performance (Goschke & 
Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998) or verbally recall these actions (Freeman & Ellis, 2003b). In 
contrast to other experiments that yielded no intention-superiority effect, in our experiment 
the quality of the task output (the grading decision) was evaluated in public. Participants 
expected to justify in front of others the reasons that made them give a certain grade. The 
quality of their grading decision was personally relevant. Under these conditions, we 
observed an intention-superiority effect both for the monitoring task that involved grading 
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actions observed on a video clip and for a monitoring task maximally unrelated to enactment 
(i.e., monitoring a written report).  
We assume that the observed intention-superiority effect in Experiments 1-2 reflects a 
participants’ high commitment to fulfil the intended task properly because their outcome was 
evaluated. In other words, the crucial difference between our experiment where an intention-
superiority effect was observed and previous null results appears to be outcome evaluation. 
What is missing to increase the strength of our argument is a direct manipulation of outcome 
evaluation.  
2.3 Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3 participants either expected to discuss their task performance with 
other participants or they expected to fulfil the intended task with no one evaluating their task 
performance. Thus the quality of task performance was either personally relevant or had no 
personally relevant consequences. We used two types of tasks: enactment and monitoring a 
written report.  
Previous studies have demonstrated a robust intention-superiority effect for an 
enactment task (Dockree & Ellis, 2001; Freeman & Ellis, 2003b; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 
Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, et al., 1999). We assume that in these experiments the motivation 
to fulfil the enactment task properly was high because participants anticipated some kind of 
evaluation of their enactment performance by the experimenter. Consequently, we expected 
to replicate an intention-superiority effect for participants who were told that their enactment 
performance would be evaluated by other participants. Replicating Experiments 1-2, we also 
expected an intention-superiority effect for a monitoring task if an evaluation of monitoring 
performance was anticipated.  
For participants who were told that they could realize the prospective tasks without 
evaluation, it was rather irrelevant how good they performed at the respective task although 
they also were asked to realize the intended tasks. Similar to the observation task used by 
Goschke and Kuhl (1993), participants could realize the task properly, but they did not have 
to. Thus if outcome evaluation were a crucial factor that increases the accessibility of 
intention-related materials, we should find comparable response latencies for stimuli of the 
prospective list and the neutral list if the task performance is not evaluated, irrespective of the 
type of task (enactment or monitoring). Contrasting our hypotheses, if the intention-
superiority effect were mainly due to the availability of motor information as proposed by 
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Freeman and Ellis (2003b), we should observe an intention-superiority effect for all 
participants who intend to enact the actions, with or without evaluation.  
2.3.1 Method 
2.3.1.1  Participants  
Sixty-four participants were recruited on campus (age: 18 – 29 years, M = 23, SD = 3; 
50% female). They received financial compensation for participation (3 !). Sixteen 
participants were randomly allocated to each group. 
2.3.1.2 Materials and Procedure  
Study lists, the lexical-decision task, and to-be-monitored materials for the monitoring 
task were taken from Experiment 2. Two participants were tested in each session.2 They were 
asked to learn two lists of actions for future tasks. They were going to enact one studied list 
and to monitor and grade a written report of the other list. Half of participants were informed 
that they were going to discuss their performance with the other participant. For these 
participants the motivation to fulfil the intended tasks properly should be high as in 
Experiments 1-2. The other half of participants was informed that they could realize tasks 
anonymously. It was emphasized that no one would watch the enactment performance behind 
a partition wall and that the grading decision of the written report could not be traced back to 
the specific person. Although participants had to realize the intended task, the quality of their 
task performance (the outcome) was irrelevant.  
                                                
 
2 In Experiments 1-2 participants took part in groups of two to four. In Experiment 1, ten 
participants were tested in pairs, twenty-four participants were tested in groups of three, and 
twelve participants were tested in groups of four. In Experiment 2, six participants were 
tested in pairs, six participants were tested in groups of three, and another twenty participants 
were tested in groups of four. In order to rule out that group size affected the size of the 
intention-superiority effect in our previous experiments, we computed for each experiment an 
ANOVA with group size (two, three or four) and task as independent variables, and size of 
intention-superiority effect (latencies for cancelled list minus latencies for prospective list) as 
dependent variable. There were no significant effects in Experiment 1, all Fs < 1, or 
Experiment 2, all Fs < 1.4.  Thus, the size of the group did not affect the intention-superiority 
effect in Experiment 1 and 2. In Experiment 3, all participants were tested in pairs. 
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Otherwise, the procedure was identical to our previous experiments. Participants 
studied the two lists with the intention of enacting one list and grading a written report of the 
other list. After a delay task, the experimenter cancelled for half of participants the enactment 
task (thus monitoring a written report remained the relevant task); for the other half the 
monitoring task was cancelled (and the enactment task remained the relevant task). Next 
participants completed the LDT. Then they indicated what task they were going to perform 
(enactment or monitoring) and memory for the prospective and cancelled list was tested in an 
unexpected free recall. Afterwards they completed the denoted task. Participants who 
expected an outcome evaluation either enacted the prospective list in the presence of their 
partner or they gave a school grade for recall performance, and subsequently discussed the 
respective task performance with their partner. Participants who expected no outcome 
evaluation enacted the prospective list behind a partition wall or they gave a grade for the 
verbal report without discussing it. Finally, importance ratings of the task and demographic 
data were collected and participants were debriefed.  
A minor change to previous experiments concerned the delay task. In order to avoid 
social interactions between participants before task realization, we used a written task instead 
of a get-to-know-each-other as the delay task. The participants were instructed to write down 
their opinions about different topics (e.g., studying abroad, tuition fees). The experimenter 
interrupted the task after four minutes allegedly due to time constraints. This seemed a nice 
way to rule out that the social delay task affected the results of Experiments 1-2. Participants 
who expected their task performance to be evaluated interacted with the other participant 
only after the LDT. In addition, for participants who were told that task realization is 
anonymous and private, a social delay task may have reduced the credibility of this 
manipulation.  
2.3.1.3 Design 
Task (enactment vs. monitoring a written report) and outcome evaluation (with vs. 
without) were manipulated between subjects. Word type (prospective list, cancelled list, 
distracter) was manipulated within subject. Main dependent variables were response latencies 
in the lexical-decision task.  
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2.3.2 Results 
2.3.2.1 Preliminary Analyses  
Importance ratings were analysed in a 2 (task) " 2 (outcome evaluation) ANOVA. No 
effects were statistically significant (all Fs < 3.4; with outcome evaluation: M = 4.8 for the 
enactment task and M = 4.7 for monitoring a written report; without outcome evaluation: M = 
3.8 for the enactment task and M = 5.3 for monitoring a written report, with higher values 
indicating higher importance ratings). The majority of participants who expected an 
evaluation (out of 16: 11 for the enactment task, 13 for the monitoring task) as well as those 
who expected no evaluation (14 for the enactment task, 11 for the monitoring task) recalled 
both lists perfectly. The other participants remembered at least three actions of each list.  
2.3.2.2 Lexical-decision Task  
Incorrect trials (3.8%) and outliers (1.2%) were removed from lexical-decision data. 
As shown in the upper half of Figure 3 there was, again, an intention-superiority effect if an 
outcome evaluation was expected. The lower half of Figure 2 shows that there was no 
indication of an intention-superiority effect if the tasks were going to be realized without 
further relevant consequences. In a 2 (task) " 2 (outcome evaluation) " 3 (word type) mixed 
ANOVA the corresponding interaction of word type and outcome evaluation was significant, 
F(2,120) = 4.09, R2p = .06. Simple main effect analyses indicated differences between word 
types for participants expecting an outcome evaluation, F(2,59) = 4.67, R2p = .14, but not for 
participants expecting no evaluation, F < 1. Replicating Experiment 1, when participants 
expected a public evaluation of their performance, words of the prospective list (M = 713 ms) 
were faster classified than words of the cancelled list (M = 761 ms), t(31) = 4.13, R2p = .35. 
Again, prospective words were also faster classified than distracter words (M = 736 ms), 
t(31) = 2.57, R2p = .18, but latencies for words of the cancelled list and distracter words did 
not differ significantly, t(31) < 1.8, p = .10. However, if no evaluation of task performance 
was expected latencies for words of the prospective list (M = 740 ms), the cancelled list (M = 
732 ms) and distracter words (M = 745 ms) were comparable, ts < 1.2.  There was also a task 
" evaluation interaction, F(1,60) = 5.46, R2p = .08, indicating differences between groups in 
overall reaction times. More importantly, neither the task " word type interaction nor the 
three-way interaction was significant, Fs < 1. 
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Figure  3. Mean response latencies for words of the prospective list, the cancelled list, and 
distracter words, separately for each task, enactment and monitoring a written report, and for 
participants expecting an outcome evaluation or no outcome evaluation in Experiment 3. 
Error bars represent standard errors of means. 
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2.3.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 are in line with the assumption that motivational aspects, 
here the expectation of an outcome evaluation, contribute to the intention-superiority effect. 
Replicating Experiment 1-2 we observed an intention-superiority effect if task realization was 
going to be evaluated by others. In contrast, when task realization was private, there was no 
indication for faster reactions to intention-relevant stimuli. The null finding for the enactment 
task without evaluation is particularly interesting. If the availability of motor information 
determined the intention-superiority effect, there should have been a reaction-time advantage 
for to-be-enacted materials relative to neutral materials irrespective of the evaluation 
situation. 
The ratings on the importance of the intended task did not differ significantly between 
groups. Yet, descriptively, the enactment task without evaluation was rated less important 
than the enactment task with relevant consequences in terms of an evaluation. At first sight 
this finding supports the assumption of an intention-superiority effect for more important 
tasks. However, if task importance per se was central we should have also observed an 
intention-superiority effect in both monitoring-task conditions. The importance ratings for the 
monitoring task without evaluation were descriptively even higher than ratings for the same 
task with relevant consequences. It thus seems that reported task importance is not a reliable 
proxy for the consequences of task realization in terms of an evaluation; the latter were 
essential for a heightened accessibility.  
2.4 General Discussion 
The main hypothesis brought forward in the present research was that motivational 
aspects such as expectation of an outcome evaluation or relevance of an intended task 
contribute to the intention-superiority effect. In three experiments we demonstrated a 
heightened accessibility for intention-relevant stimuli relative to other learned materials when 
task realization had personally relevant consequences in terms of an evaluation of the task 
performance. This intention-superiority effect was independent of the type of prospective 
task. There was an intention-superiority effect if task realization was checked in terms of an 
outcome evaluation and thus, presumably, participants’ commitment to fulfil the task 
properly was high. Our findings are consistent with theories that consider intentions as 
motivational states characterized by enhanced accessibility (e.g., Förster, et al., 2005; Lewin, 
1926). Although a strategic allocation of attentional resources may have also strengthened the 
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accessibility of intention-relevant material during postponement, we think the main source of 
activation is motivational. As Experiment 3 clearly demonstrates heightened activation was 
restricted to tasks associated with personally relevant consequences (here: an outcome 
evaluation), be they related to the execution of actions or not. 
In contrast to other studies (Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, et al., 1999, but see Dockree 
& Ellis, 2001, Experiment 1), in our experiments responses to previously studied words were 
not generally faster than responses to new distracter words in the lexical-decision task. 
Although words of the previously learned, prospective list were faster classified than new 
distracter words, response latencies for words of the previously learned, but cancelled list did 
not differ significantly from new distracter words. Considering Marsh et al.’s (1999) findings 
of slower latencies for cancelled materials relative to other learned materials, an inhibitory 
account may explain our finding. Initial activation and subsequent inhibition may have led to 
comparable response latencies as to new distracter words. Inhibiting information associated 
with the cancelled task may be adaptive in order to avoid an accidental initiation of task 
execution when intentions become impossible to complete (e.g. going to stop at a library to 
borrow a book beyond opening hours) (for a more detailed discussion of inhibitory processes 
see  Förster, et al., 2007). 
In everyday life, the announced evaluation of one’s performance in an intended task is 
a rather uncommon means to ensure prospective remembering. We used an evaluation 
announcement for several reasons. First, it allowed us to manipulate the type of intended task 
(enactment or monitoring) while holding the consequences of failure (a poor performance 
feedback) constant. Second, the announced evaluation ensured that the experimenter-defined 
tasks were personally relevant for participants. Third, we think the typical postponed 
enactment task can be described as an evaluation situation. It therefore seemed reasonable to 
design other tasks that share features with a laboratory task that reliably shows an intention-
superiority effect. Future research should use more naturalistic manipulations to increase or 
decrease task relevance. In the present experiments, participants’ rating of task importance 
was not associated with the size of the intention-superiority effect. Thus, stressing the 
importance of the intended task itself might not be sufficient (or: subjective ratings are not 
reliable proxies of importance as indicated by activation). As Experiment 3 suggests a 
manipulation of task importance in terms of anticipated negative consequences of failure is 
more promising. Another possibility to strengthen the commitment to fulfil a task is 
providing benefits for successful task realization. For instance, Förster et al. (2005) reported 
faster response latencies for intention-related stimuli when intention realization was 
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associated with a high monetary incentive (1 !), but not when associated with a low incentive 
(0.05 !).  
In contrast to previous work where participants were tested in the presence of an 
experimenter (e.g., Freeman & Ellis, 2003b; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998; 
Marsh, et al., 1999), in our experiments task realization involved the interaction with other 
participants. We assume that the presence of another participant does not affect participants 
differently than the presence of an unknown experimenter. The mere presence of others is not 
sufficient to influence someone’s performance, but motivational factors are, such as 
evaluation apprehension (e.g., Cottrell, 1968). We demonstrated an intention-superiority 
effect when participants’ anticipation of a (socially) relevant evaluation of their performance 
was high. Although the observation task in previous work (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et 
al., 1998) was also a social situation, an evaluation of task performance was unlikely since no 
appraisable outcome was produced. Low evaluation apprehension in these observation tasks 
may explain the finding of comparable response latencies to intention-relevant and neutral 
stimuli. We think earlier work on the intention-superiority effect can be easily interpreted in 
terms of a heightened activation of motivation-related representations. In those studies task 
realization either was linked to an (implicit) evaluation of one’s own enactment performance 
(Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, et al., 1999) or remembering to do 
something was important for others (Dockree & Ellis, 2001). It may be that materials 
associated with prospective tasks that occur in a social context or carry implication for social 
relationships are particularly easily accessible (cf. Winograd, 1988). It would be interesting to 
test whether an intention-superiority effect can be obtained with other tasks that do not 
involve social interactions, but are personally relevant.  
Freeman and Ellis (2003b) provided some evidence that the intention-superiority 
effect is based on the activation and storage of motor information when an intention for 
future execution is formed (see also Eschen, et al., 2007, for supporting data in a fMRI 
study). The general idea is that actions verbally encoded for future enactment elicit similar 
representations as actions carried out during encoding. In both cases motor-relevant 
information is activated that facilitates recall. Following this reasoning an enactment 
intention would be crucial for an intention-superiority effect. The data pattern we observed is 
not compatible with that account because anticipated outcome evaluation, not enactment 
intention, determined the intention-superiority effect that we found (see Experiment 3). We 
cannot exclude the possibility that the materials we chose stimulated the encoding of motor 
information at study since study lists described simple distinct activities. However, speaking 
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against this idea, other experiments that used lists of action phrases for an observation task 
(Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh et al., 1998) or lists of verbs for verbal recall (Freeman & 
Ellis, 2003b) found no reaction-time difference. In sum, the missing intention-superiority 
effect for an enactment task without outcome evaluation that we found, and the intention-
superiority effect for monitoring tasks unrelated to enactment, challenge the proposition that 
motor processes are always involved in the activation of intentions in a postponed-intention 
paradigm.  
We think the increased activation in the postponed-intention paradigm reflects a more 
general phenomenon: Heightened accessibility of intention-relevant information during 
postponement. For example, Förster et al. (2005) instructed participants to get up and notify 
the experimenter when they detected a certain object combination in a series of pictures. 
Between blocks of pictures participants performed a lexical-decision task. Instead of using 
stimuli describing the content of the intention, that is, the intended actions (e.g., to get up), 
they used stimuli associated with the cue that indicates an appropriate context to realize the 
intention. Similar to an intention-superiority effect for stimuli of the intention-relevant 
actions, the authors demonstrated faster latencies to words associated with the intention-
relevant cue. Interestingly, in this research the prospective task (notifying the experimenter) 
could also be perceived as a personally relevant situation. Again, there was an appraisable 
outcome (whether participants detected the target combination or not) and an evaluator (the 
experimenter).  In a similar vein, Fitzsimons and Shah (2008) demonstrated that names of 
other people who are instrumental for achieving a specific goal are more easily accessible 
when the goal is activated. Again, information that may help to realize an intention 
successfully was more easily accessible. 
To conclude: Whereas future overt enactment at first appeared to be the relevant 
factor affecting the accessibility of intention-related stimuli, the present experiments show 
that factors presumably affecting motivation, such as anticipated outcome evaluation, 
determine the activation of intention-related materials. Whenever task performance matters, 
there is an intention-superiority effect. Thus, it appears that a more general mechanism than 
previously suggested is at work: Our cognitive system is tuned to materials associated with 
any important prospective task, be it an enactment task or not.  
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3 Rigid or Flexible Activation of Intentions? On the Role 
of the Proximity of a Retrieval Opportunity 
Very often intentions cannot be realized immediately and their execution has to be 
postponed for hours, days, or even weeks or months. Possibly, a busy individual could list 
dozens of intentions at any point in time, ranging from short-term intentions such as e-mails 
to be written, phone calls to be placed, groceries to be bought, to long-term intentions such as 
presents to be found, insurances to be checked, and travel tickets to be booked. During this 
delay information concerning the content of the intention (what one wants to do), and the 
retrieval context (when one should retrieve and execute the intention) must be retained (e.g., 
Ellis, 1996). Prospective memory refers to our ability to retrieve and execute an intended 
activity at an appropriate moment in the future. A crucial feature of prospective memory 
tasks (in contrast to retrospective memory tasks) is the absence of explicit reminders to 
retrieve the intention when a retrieval opportunity is encountered (e.g., Graf & Uttl, 2001). 
For example, if one intends to post a letter, no one tells one to take the letter out of in one’s 
briefcase when passing a letterbox. Kvavilashvili and Ellis (1996) distinguished three types 
of intentions based on characteristics of the retrieval opportunity. For event-based intentions 
the occurrence of a particular stimulus defines a retrieval opportunity (e.g., when seeing a 
letterbox), for time-based intentions a particular time (e.g., 10 a.m.) or a time interval elapsed 
(e.g., after 20 minutes) determines a retrieval opportunity, and for activity-based intentions 
the start or the end of another activity signals an appropriate retrieval opportunity (e.g., after 
reading the manuscript) (but see McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). An important question is what 
brings a representation of an intention into one’s mind at an appropriate retrieval opportunity.  
One potential mechanism discussed in the literature is that unfulfilled intentions are 
represented at a heightened level of activation compared to other long-term memory contents 
(e.g., Ellis, 1996; Förster, et al., 2005; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Lewin, 1926). A heightened 
activation of intention-related concepts could support successful prospective remembering. 
For example, it may help to detect retrieval cues in a potential retrieval context (e.g., 
Mäntylä, 1996; McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004), or it could lead to more 
frequent recollections of the intention during the retention interval, which in turn raises the 
strength of activation at the present moment and/or initiates monitoring an appropriate 
moment to realize the intended activity (e.g., Ellis, 1996). Previous research has found that 
stimuli associated with (near-term) intentions were processed faster than equivalent materials 
with no intentionality. However, as stated by Marsh, Hicks, and Bink (1998) it seems 
  
 
33 
unrealistic that all unfulfilled intentions are represented at a heightened level of activation 
throughout the day (or week, month, or year). A potential mechanism for a flexible activation 
of intentions is context information specifying the likelihood of a retrieval opportunity (e.g., 
Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2006). The primary aim of the present research was testing to what 
degree context information affects the accessibility of intention-related information. In 
particular, we assumed that the accessibility of intention-related materials increases with the 
perceived proximity of a retrieval opportunity (e.g., Dörner, 1984), as is outlined in the 
following. While testing this, our secondary aim was finding further evidence on the 
generalizability of the intention-superiority effect to non-motor tasks, as we explain at the 
end of this paper’s introduction. 
3.1 The Intention-Superiority Effect 
Previous series of experiments have examined the accessibility of intention-related 
concepts during a delay interval using a postponed-intention paradigm. Participants learned 
two short lists of actions (e.g., “setting a dinner table” and “clearing a messy desk”). After the 
study phase, they were instructed that they should carry out the actions of one list 
(prospective list), but not of the other list (neutral list) after completing a recognition test for 
both lists or a lexical-decision task. Thus, the execution of the intention had to be postponed 
until after the respective response-latency task. Response latencies for verbs and nouns of the 
prospective list were faster than latencies for stimuli of the neutral list in a recognition test 
(e.g., Freeman & Ellis, 2003b; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) as well as in a more direct measure of 
accessibility, a lexical-decision task (e.g., Dockree & Ellis, 2001; Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, 
et al., 1999; Penningroth, 2011; Schult & Steffens, in press). This reaction-time advantage 
was labelled intention-superiority effect. 
Several different accounts of the intention-superiority effect have been brought 
forward. Goschke and Kuhl (1993, 1996) interpreted the intention-superiority effect in terms 
of a more persistent activation of intention-related materials (henceforth: persistence 
hypothesis). Intended tasks are viewed as goals that are represented by special source nodes 
maintaining increased levels of sub threshold activation without rehearsal. According to this 
interpretation intention-related concepts ought to be activated for longer periods than other 
(long-term memory) concepts. However, the vast majority of studies on intention superiority 
assessed activation over a short period of time immediately after intention formation 
(Dockree & Ellis, 2001; Freeman & Ellis, 2003b, Experiment 3; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, 
Experiments 1 and 2; Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, et al., 1999; Penningroth, 2011; Schult & 
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Steffens, in press) or after a short filler task (Freeman & Ellis, 2003b, Experiment 4; Goschke 
& Kuhl, 1993, Experiment 4). In addition, the response-latency task generally lasted only a 
few minutes. For example, in Goschke and Kuhl’s experiments the recognition test lasted 
about 90-120 seconds. Based on these experiments we may conclude that a heightened 
activation of intentions “persists” over relatively short intervals. As Marsh et al. (1998) point 
out it may be functional to keep an intention active for such short delays (see also Lebiere & 
Lee, 2002). There is little evidence that the intention-superiority effect persists over an 
extended period of time after forming the intention: A heightened activation of intentions 
shortly after encoding does not necessarily imply a persistent heightened activation until a 
retrieval opportunity (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2002).   
3.2 The Role of the Context 
In the following we propose an alternative to the persistence hypothesis. In a 
postponed-intention paradigm participants are usually instructed to realize the intention 
immediately after completing the recognition test or the lexical-decision task (Dockree & 
Ellis, 2001, for an exception). Thus, the respective task could become associated with a 
retrieval opportunity. The potential beneficial effects of such context information have not 
been investigated when examining the intention-superiority effect. We argue that associated 
context information may modify the strength of activation of intention-related stimuli (see 
also Marsh, Hicks, et al., 2006).  
There is some indirect evidence supporting this notion. Previous studies have 
demonstrated that linking an intention with a particular activity, that is, specifying a retrieval 
context, improves intention completion within this activity. For example, Nowinski and 
Dismukes (2005, Experiment 1) asked participants to press a specific key whenever a fruit 
word appeared within two activities (a matching task and an anagram task). During 
instructions they linked one activity with the event-based intention by giving an example (e.g. 
“in the anagram task, or during any other task”, p. 652). Although instructions made clear 
that a retrieval opportunity could appear at any time in both activities, participants detected 
retrieval opportunities (fruit words) more often when these occurred during the associated 
activity (anagram task) compared to the other activity (matching task). Cook, Marsh and 
Hicks (2005) reported similar findings for time-based intentions. Participants responded more 
often in a critical time window (between 6 and 7 minutes after the start of the experiment) if 
the retrieval opportunity occurred during an activity specified during instructions than when 
no context information was given. Those authors argued that information specifying the 
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broader context during which a retrieval opportunity could occur serves as an additional 
source of activation that contributes to the level of activation of the intention, which in turn 
improves chances of intention completion (Cook, et al., 2005; Nowinski & Dismukes, 2005). 
Further research suggests that this associated context information is used to change 
attentional allocation policies away from the current activity (e.g. a lexical-decision task) and 
toward the processing of intention-related information (Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006; Marsh, 
Hicks, et al., 2006) (for a computational simulation of the intention-superiority effect as a 
biased allocation of attentional resources see Lebiere & Lee, 2002).  
A final piece of evidence for our notion of context-sensitive activation of intentions 
was reported by Förster et al. (2005). These authors instructed their participants to detect a 
particular sequence of items in a picture task. In addition, they manipulated participants’ 
expectations concerning the probability that the critical sequence of pictures would occur in 
the experiment. The probability was either high or low. During blocks of the picture task 
participants completed a lexical-decision task. Thus the assessment of accessibility was 
immediately prior to a retrieval opportunity, that is, the next block of the picture task. 
Participants responded to intention-related stimuli faster than to other stimuli if a retrieval 
opportunity was highly probable, but not if the occurrence of a retrieval opportunity was 
rather improbable. The postponed-intention paradigm as introduced by Goschke and Kuhl 
(1993) is comparable to Förster et al.’s condition of a highly probable retrieval opportunity. 
Participants expect to complete the intention after completing an (short) intervening task that 
thus signals the retrieval opportunity. Extending these lines of research to a postponed-
intention paradigm we would expect faster responses to prospective stimuli compared to 
neutral stimuli in a context associated with a likely retrieval opportunity, but not in other 
contexts.  In other words, there should be an intention-superiority effect if a retrieval 
opportunity for the intention is linked to the respective task. 
To summarize, several experiments on the intention-superiority effect have suggested 
that intention-related concepts enjoy a privileged status in memory in terms of heightened 
accessibility. However, we know little about the contribution of context information to the 
accessibility of intentions. Most experiments demonstrating an intention-superiority effect 
chose situations in which a persistent activation as well as context information would 
contribute to the accessibility of intention-related materials. First, the assessment of 
activation began shortly after intention formation. A heightened activation after intention 
formation does not necessarily imply a heightened accessibility of intention-related materials 
at some future moment as postulated by the persistence hypothesis. Second, the reaction-time 
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measure was usually associated with a retrieval opportunity during instructions and the 
occurrence of the retrieval opportunity in the near future was highly probable. Given previous 
evidence that context information may improve the probability of intention completion and 
the processing of intention-related materials, such context information might be crucial for a 
flexible accessibility of intentions. This would be in line with more general theories of 
prospective remembering. For example, Smith (2008) proposed that context information is 
used to instantiate preparatory attentional and memory processes. In order to test between the 
proposed context hypothesis and a persistence hypothesis, we inserted a short delay task 
between intention formation and the assessment of activation and then manipulated whether 
the intention was to be realized immediately after the assessment of activation, or not 
(Experiment 4); or we assessed activation across an extended time interval (Experiments 5-
6).  
3.3 Is the Intention-Superiority Effect Restricted to a Motor Task? 
The secondary aim of the present research was to replicate an intention-superiority 
effect in a monitoring task. Freeman and Ellis (2003b) proposed that the intention-superiority 
effect is due to encoding of motor information associated with the intention of future 
enactment (e.g., Koriat, et al., 1990, for a similar reasoning) (see also Eschen, et al., 2007, for 
supporting data in a fMRI study). In line with this motor-code hypothesis the intention-
superiority effect in previous studies appeared to be restricted to future enactment (e.g., 
Dockree & Ellis, 2001; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998; Marsh, et al., 1999; 
Penningroth, 2011), and attempts to demonstrate an intention-superiority effect for a 
observation task (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, et al., 1998) or verbal recall (Freeman & 
Ellis, 2003b) yielded no respective evidence. Recently, however, we provided some evidence 
that the intention-superiority effect may reflect a more general phenomenon of a heightened 
accessibility of personally relevant intentions, be they related to the future execution of 
actions or not (Schult & Steffens, in press). We found an intention-superiority effect in a 
lexical-decision task for different types of intended tasks that did not necessarily involve a 
motor response (e.g., giving a grade for a written recall test) provided that the quality of task 
performance was personally relevant for participants. In those experiments we strengthened 
personal relevance by announcing a public outcome evaluation: Participants expected to 
discuss their own performance at the intended task with a partner (e.g. comparing and 
justifying their grading decision). We reasoned that a public evaluation of one’s outcome 
would strengthen participants’ motivation to complete the intention properly (Meacham, 
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1988). One may object against our findings that intention-related materials were relevant for 
two future tasks: For performing the intended task (e.g. giving a grade) and subsequently for 
discussing one’s decision in the presence of another participant. By implication it is possible 
that no intention-superiority effect can be observed for single non-motor tasks. In order to 
exclude this possibility in the present experiments we also included non-motor tasks and, in 
order to increase the motivation to fulfil the task, we simply stated that the experimenter 
would judge participants’ performance. Hence, as in our previous experiments participants 
expected an outcome evaluation, but intention-related materials were only relevant for 
performing the intended task. If the expectation of an outcome evaluation is a contributing 
factor in the intention-superiority effect, as we argue, we should replicate an intention-
superiority effect for the monitoring intention as well as the enactment intention in a 
recognition test.  
3.4 Overview of Experiments 
Starting point of the present research was the notion that context information allows a 
flexible activation and deactivation of intentions. In three experiments we tested to which 
extent context information modifies the accessibility of intention-related concepts. All 
experiments included an enactment as well as a monitoring condition. Our expectation was 
that intention-superiority effects should generalize across task conditions. 
In Experiment 4 we manipulated the significance of a recognition test as a cue for a 
proximate retrieval opportunity. Half of our participants expected, analogous to previous 
experiments, to realize the intended task after the recognition test. The other half of the 
participants expected a retrieval opportunity after the recognition test and another task. In 
both retrieval conditions accessibility of intention-related and neutral materials were assessed 
at the same time about one minute after intention formation. Thus, if intentions persisted on a 
higher level of activation as originally proposed by Goschke and Kuhl (1993, 1996), we 
should observe an intention-superiority effect in both conditions. If the accessibility of 
intention-related materials, however, is sensitive to context information, we should observe 
an intention-superiority effect only for those participants who expect to realize the intention 
immediately after the recognition test.  
In Experiment 5 and 6 we tested whether the accessibility of intention-related 
materials fluctuates within an associated task as a function of the probability of a retrieval 
opportunity. Participants expected to realize the intention after finishing a recognition test 
consisting of several blocks. Information concerning task progression was given between 
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recognition blocks. This information offered cues to estimate whether a retrieval occasion 
was probable in the near future, that is, after the next block. Again, if the accessibility of 
intention-related materials were sensitive to context information, there should be a 
pronounced intention-superiority effect in the last block prior intention execution, but not in 
other blocks after which there was no retrieval opportunity. If, however, intentions were 
generally supported by stronger or longer-lasting representations, one would expect an 
intention-superiority effect across the different blocks.  
3.5 Experiment 4 
In most experiments using a postponed-intention paradigm the task that assessed the 
accessibility of intention-related concepts was also associated with a retrieval opportunity. 
We argue that such context information increases the accessibility of intention-related 
information. In Experiment 4 we manipulated the role of a recognition test as an associated 
retrieval context. Half of the participants expected to realize the intended task after 
completing the recognition test (proximate retrieval opportunity). As in previous experiments 
the recognition test was associated with a retrieval opportunity. The other half of participants 
expected to realize the intention after completing the recognition test and another successive 
task  (distant retrieval opportunity). Thus, although levels of activation were assessed at the 
same moment as in the proximate-retrieval condition, the recognition test itself was no 
relevant cue for a retrieval opportunity.  
We added a short filler task between instructions specifying the prospective list and 
the beginning of the recognition test. First, an additional task unrelated to the recognition test 
or the intended task should prevent participants from maintaining the intention active in 
working memory during the whole retention interval. If we still demonstrate an intention-
superiority effect this is more likely due to longer-lasting persistent activation or context-
sensitive re-activation of intention-related materials rather than active maintaining processes. 
Second, as Goschke and Kuhl (1993) pointed out, intention-related materials may not 
constantly remain on a heightened level of activation, but decay at a slower rate than 
intention-irrelevant materials. Still, there should be a reliable intention-superiority effect after 
about one minute (cf. Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, Experiment 4). Thus if a heightened 
accessibility of intention-related materials persists after intention formation, we should find 
an intention-superiority effect in the recognition test. According to the persistence hypothesis, 
this effect should be independent of whether the task is going to be realized immediately after 
the recognition test or at a more distant moment in the future. In line with a context 
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hypothesis, however, there should be an intention-superiority effect for participants in the 
proximate-retrieval condition, but not for those in the distant-retrieval condition.  
We also manipulated the type of intended task between participants. Half of them 
intended to carry out a list of actions in the presence of the experimenter (enactment task) and 
the other half intended to monitor and register mistakes in the experimenter’s enactment 
performance (monitoring task). All participants were told that the experimenter would 
evaluate their performance in the respective task. In line with our previous findings we 
predicted an intention-superiority effect independent of the type of task (enactment or 
monitoring) because participants expected an evaluation of their outcome (Schult & Steffens, 
in press). The monitoring task was very similar to previous attempts that yielded no reaction-
time differences between intention-related and neutral materials (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 
Marsh, et al., 1998). The major difference to previous studies was that participants in our 
monitoring condition were asked to produce some kind of objective performance outcome 
(which errors did the experimenter made?) and that this outcome would be evaluated by the 
experimenter, whereas in the previous studies, task performance was not evaluated.  
3.5.1 Method 
3.5.1.1 Participants  
Forty-nine undergraduates (age: 18 – 39 years, M = 22, SD = 3.8; 81 % women) 
volunteered in exchange for course credit. One participant (proximate-retrieval opportunity, 
monitoring task) who thought the experiment was finished after the recognition test was 
replaced. Twelve students were randomly assigned to each condition. 
3.5.1.2 Materials  
Study materials were modelled after Goschke and Kuhl (1993): Two lists describing 
simple activities (brewing coffee, making a sandwich) were used. Each list consisted of six 
typical verb-object phrases. The recognition test consisted of 24 list words (the six verbs and 
six nouns of each study list) and 24 distracter words (eight words related to brewing coffee, 
eight words related to making a sandwich, eight unrelated words; see Appendix B). Stimuli 
of both study lists were comparable concerning word length and familiarity.  
3.5.1.3 Procedure  
Participants were tested individually. When entering the laboratory, they were seated 
in front of a computer. The experimenter left the room with the remark: „If you need me, I 
  
 
40 
am in the room next door“. All instructions were presented on a computer screen. At the 
beginning, participants were instructed to learn two lists of actions for a later (unspecified) 
memory test, emphasizing that they should be able to distinguish what action belonged to 
which list. Thus, neither the type of memory task nor the future performance task for one list 
was mentioned prior to the study phase. The presentation of study materials followed 
Goschke and Kuhl’s (1993) procedure: First, a list title (e.g. List 1) and each action of a list 
appeared on the screen one at a time for five seconds. Next, the whole list (and the list title) 
was presented for 30 seconds. Then the second list was presented in the same way. Both lists 
were presented alternately three times. The first presented list was always called List 1 and 
the second one List 2. The overall topic of the list (e.g. making a sandwich) was not 
mentioned during study phase. The presentation order of the two lists was counterbalanced 
across participants. Each list served equally often as List 1 and as List 2. 
After studying both lists, participants were informed that they were going to work on 
a series of tasks and each task was explained shortly on a separate computer screen. Reading 
time was assessed for task explanations. First, the generation task was explained as „write 
down as many different examples of a given category within 30 seconds as possible“ and an 
example (flowers …rose, aster, geranium) was given. Second, the recognition test was 
introduced. Participants were told that a word would be presented in the middle of the screen. 
They should press the “y” -key as fast as possible if the word had appeared in one of the two 
studied lists or the “n” – key if it had not. Both keys were marked with a yellow point. Third, 
a performance task was announced. Half of the participants were told that they were going to 
carry out the actions of one list in a nearby kitchen in the presence of the experimenter 
(enactment task). The other half of participants were told that they were going to monitor the 
experimenter’s execution of one list of actions and notice all errors (monitoring task). To 
make sure that participants perceived the respective task as personally relevant, it was stated 
that the experimenter would evaluate their performance. An incomplete execution of the 
respective list of actions or the none-detection of errors in the experimenter’s performance 
would lead to a poor evaluation.  
In addition to the type of intended task, we manipulated participants’ expectations 
when to realize the performance task. Half of the participants were instructed to get up and 
notify the experimenter in the room next door as soon as they had finished the memory task, 
that is, the recognition test (proximate-retrieval opportunity). The other half of the 
participants was asked to notify the experimenter after they had finished a short pre-test for 
another experiment following the memory task. The pre-test asked them to describe a 
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particular students subgroup (e.g., law students are …). Although these participants worked 
on the recognition test at the same time as participants of the other group (after the generation 
task), the recognition test did not signify an appropriate retrieval context (distant-retrieval 
opportunity). After those instructions, information specifying which list had to be executed or 
monitored, respectively, were presented on a separate screen. In the upper third of the screen 
the words “after the memory test” (proximate retrieval) or “after the pre-test” (distant 
retrieval) were displayed. After two seconds the computer beeped and two sentences 
appeared simultaneously in the middle of the same screen in two rows: One sentence 
indicated the prospective list (e.g., enact List 1), the other one indicated the neutral list (e.g., 
do not enact List 2). These instructions were displayed for another three seconds. Both study 
lists served equally often as prospective list. The position of the prospective and the neutral 
list was randomized across participants.  
Subsequently, participants completed the series of tasks. Each type of task (generation 
task, memory task, pre-test) was announced for three seconds before the first trial of the 
respective task started. The first trial of each task was announced with a signal tone. First the 
words “generation task” appeared in the middle of the screen. The task consisted of two 
trials, each lasting 30 seconds. Different categories (e.g. furniture) were used across 
participants. Between both trials participants could rest for five seconds. During the break the 
information “Continuing soon” was displayed. Next the words “memory test” were 
presented. The related future performance task was not mentioned at that moment. During the 
recognition test the words “old” and “new” were displayed at the left and right upper side of 
the screen. Each trial started with a fixation cross for 250 ms followed by the presentation of 
the stimulus in the middle of the screen. The word remained on the screen until participants 
pressed the “y” or “n”-key. If participants pressed the wrong key they received an auditory 
feedback (a beep). The intertrial interval was 500 ms. In the proximate-retrieval condition the 
word “End” appeared on the screen after the last trial of the recognition test. In the distant-
retrieval condition the word “Pre-test” appeared on the screen and participants wrote down 
typical characteristics of a particular students subgroup. The pre-test ended after 30 seconds 
and the word “End” appeared on the screen.  
When participants went to the experimenter room, they were asked why they came. 
One participant thought the experiment was finished and was therefore replaced. The 
remaining participants expected that they were going to enact or monitor the prospective list 
in a nearby kitchen. Instead of performing the intended task participants were seated again in 
the laboratory and answered a short computer-based questionnaire.  First, they indicated 
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which list they had intended to realize (List 1, List 2, or don’t know) and how they would 
entitle the respective list (making a sandwich, brewing coffee, or don’t know) as a 
manipulation check. Finally, free recall of the prospective list was assessed. No objects 
related to the list were available during recall.  
3.5.1.4 Design  
Retrieval opportunity (proximate vs. distant) and task (enactment vs. monitoring) 
were manipulated between subjects. List type (prospective vs. neutral) was manipulated 
within subject. Main dependent variables were response latencies and hit rates in the 
recognition test.  
3.5.2 Results 
For all statistical analyses, the Type-I-error was set at ! < .06. As an indicator of the 
effect size, partial R2 (R2p) is reported for statistically significant effects (J. Cohen, 1977).  
3.5.2.1 Preliminary Analyses 
 All participants indicated the correct prospective list (List 1 or List 2) and the correct, 
previously not mentioned topic (brewing coffee or making a sandwich). For free recall a 
liberal criterion was chosen because a successful task realization (enacting or monitoring the 
actions) did not require a verbatim recall of the intended actions and we did not instruct 
participants to recall actions word for word. All participants in the enactment condition 
completely recalled the prospective list. Three participants in the monitoring condition (one 
participant in the proximate-opportunity condition, two participants in the distant-opportunity 
condition) recalled at least four actions. In sum, free recall was rather good indicating that 
study time was sufficient to learn materials. In this and the following experiments the 
reported pattern of results did not change when participants with imperfect recall were 
excluded. 
Instructions concerning the recognition test and the performance task were given after 
the study phase. Total reading time for instructions did not differ between groups (all Fs < 
1.4; proximate-retrieval condition: M = 84.1, SD = 13.6 seconds for the enactment task and M 
= 94.4, SD = 35.6 seconds for the monitoring task; distant-retrieval condition: M = 97.8, SD = 
21.7 seconds for the enactment task and M = 98.2, SD = 28.7 seconds for the monitoring 
task).  
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Table 1. Mean Response Latencies and Hit Rates (with Standard Deviations) for Stimuli of 
the Prospective and the Neutral List, separately for Retrieval Opportunity and Task in 
Experiment 4. 
Retrieval Opportunity Proximate  Distant  
List  Prospective  Neutral Prospective  Neutral 
Task M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Response Latencies 
Enactment 889 (185) 974 (178) 1051 (159) 1031 (197) 
Monitoring 889 (198) 1050 (317) 965 (190) 971 (225) 
Hits 
Enactment .96 (.08) .89 (.09) .89 (.10) .93 (.11) 
Monitoring .88 (.14) .90 (.12) .92 (.12) .92 (.08) 
 
3.5.2.2 Recognition Task  
In all experiments, incorrect trials and response latencies beyond 3 SDs of each 
participant’s individual mean response were excluded from analyses, and statistical analyses 
were carried out on log-transformed scores. In Experiment 4, 9 % of the total number of trials 
were incorrect and 2 % were outliers. Table 1 presents mean response latencies and 
recognition accuracy for stimuli of both lists. Response latencies for stimuli from the 
prospective and the neutral list were analyzed in a 2 (retrieval opportunity) " 2 (task) " 2 
(list) mixed ANOVA. In line with a previous set of experiments (Schult & Steffens, in press), 
no effects involving the factor task were significant, all Fs < 1.3. There was a main effect of 
list, F(1,44) = 4.64, R2p = .10, and this effect was qualified by a list  " retrieval opportunity 
interaction, F(1,44) = 9.03, R2p = .17. To examine the interaction we computed simple main 
effect tests. As expected following the context hypothesis, there was an intention-superiority 
effect if the recognition test was associated with a retrieval opportunity in the proximate 
future [M = 889 ms vs. M = 1012 ms; simple main effect: F(1,44) = 13.3, R2p = .23], and 
response latencies were comparable for prospective and neutral stimuli if the intention was 
going to be realized at a more distant moment after another task [M = 1008 ms vs. M = 1001 
ms; simple main effect: F < 1].  
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As an index of recognition accuracy we computed the proportion of items correctly 
classified as old for each condition (cf. Freeman & Ellis, 2003b). There were no significant 
effects in a 2 (retrieval opportunity) " 2 (task) " 2 (list) mixed ANOVA, all Fs < 2. Thus a 
privileged status of intention-related materials was not reflected in recognition accuracy. 3 
3.5.3 Discussion 
Experiment 4 demonstrated that an association between the intention and the 
recognition test as a future retrieval context affects the intention-superiority effect. We found 
a reaction-time advantage for prospective stimuli compared to more neutral stimuli if the 
recognition test was associated with an opportunity to realize the intention. There was no 
intention-superiority effect if the recognition test was irrelevant in terms of a retrieval 
opportunity, although response latencies were assessed at the same moment as in the 
proximate-opportunity condition. The results are not easily compatible with the persistence 
hypothesis: If intentions simply persisted at a higher level of accessibility after intention 
formation than other materials we should have observed an intention-superiority effect in 
both retrieval conditions. Already one minute after intention-formation response latencies 
were comparable for intention-related and neutral stimuli in the distant-retrieval condition. 
This also indicates the rather quick vanishing of an intention-superiority effect present 
immediately after intention formation as demonstrated in most experiments (e.g., Dockree & 
Ellis, 2001; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh et al., 1998, 1999). In sum, the results of 
Experiment 1 corroborate our notion of a context-sensitive activation of intentions. An 
interesting question is if intention-related materials are more accessible throughout a task 
                                                
 
3 In Experiments 4-5 we also examined response latencies and false alarm rates for distracter 
stimuli related to the prospective as well as to the neutral list. We reasoned that if participants 
formed a more general intention (e.g., making a sandwich) this should result in slower 
response latencies or higher false alarm rates when rejecting intention-related distracter 
stimuli. In both experiments response latencies and false alarm rates did not differ 
significantly between distracter stimuli related to the prospective and the more neutral list. 
Thus in the present experiments it seems that a heightened accessibility of intention-related 
materials was specific to the learned actions. However, stimuli encoding with arbitrary list 
titles (e.g. List 1) instead of a general topic (e.g. “making a sandwich”) may have prevented a 
more generalized representation of the to-be-realized task. Because in Experiment 6 both lists 
shared a common topic no such comparison was possible. 
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associated with a retrieval opportunity or if accessibility fluctuates with perceived proximity 
to the retrieval opportunity. Therefore in the following experiments we held constant the 
context in which the retrieval opportunity would occur: All participants were instructed to 
complete the intention after completing a recognition test. Blocks within the recognition test, 
however, varied with regard to the proximity of a retrieval opportunity.    
As expected, no effects involving the factor task were significant. Replicating 
previous findings intention-related information was processed faster if this intention was 
relevant for the participants, being related to a motor response or not (Schult & Steffens, in 
press). As in our earlier research we strengthened motivation by announcing an outcome 
evaluation. In contrast to those experiments, participants received a feedback from the 
experimenter rather than from other participants. The present findings indicate that 
motivational aspects such as evaluation apprehension rather than participants’ active 
involvement in an evaluation contribute to a heightened activation of intentions in a 
postponed-intention paradigm.  
A heightened accessibility of intention-related materials was reflected in faster 
recognition latencies, but not in increased recognition accuracy (see also Freeman & Ellis, 
2003b). Considering that participants learned the two lists only a few minutes before the 
recognition test and that both lists were equally important during the study phase comparable 
recognition accuracy is not surprising. It shows that participants learned both lists rather well. 
Possibly, response latencies are a more sensitive measure than memory accuracy to assess the 
accessibility of intention-related materials for shortly postponed intentions. 
3.6 Experiment 5 
In Experiment 4 starting the recognition test indicated for participants in the 
proximate-retrieval condition that a retrieval opportunity would occur in the near future. We 
observed an intention-superiority effect over a short interval after the start of the recognition 
test. However, we can only speculate about the time-course of activation within an associated 
retrieval context. The knowledge that a retrieval opportunity will occur after the recognition 
test could increase the accessibility of intentions persistently within the associated task. There 
is at least some suggestive evidence for this interpretation. In one experiment Goschke and 
Kuhl (1993, Experiment 3; for details see also Goschke & Kuhl, 1996; Kuhl & Goschke, 
1994) asked participants to work on a recognition test until “they felt that 15 min had passed” 
(p. 1216). They observed a main effect of intention-superiority across three blocks of the 
recognition test, but no statistically significant interaction of list (prospective vs. neutral) and 
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block (after intention formation, centre block, prior intention execution). Therefore the 
authors interpreted their results in terms of a more persistent activation of intention-related 
materials. However, a close inspection of the findings indicates a strong intention-superiority 
effect in the first block immediately after intention formation and in a last block immediately 
before participants interrupted the test. In a centre block the reaction-time advantage for 
intention-related materials was descriptively smaller. In sum, the notion that increased 
accessibility of intentions persists throughout the recognition test deserves replication.   
In the following experiments the appropriate moment to execute the intention was 
defined as after the recognition test. The appropriate retrieval opportunity, that is the end of 
the task, was experimenter-defined rather than participant-defined as in Goschke and Kuhl 
(1993, Experiment 3). Our main interest was testing whether the accessibility of intention-
related materials varied within the recognition test corresponding to the cue-signaled 
probability of a retrieval opportunity. In everyday intentions subtle cues signal when an 
associated activity is going to end in the near future (e.g., reading the last page of a 
manuscript). Attempting to model such cues in a computer-based recognition test, we divided 
the recognition test into distinct blocks separated by short breaks during which information 
concerning general task progression was given. For all participants the recognition test 
consisted of three blocks, but the number of blocks was not specified in advance. The first 
block began immediately after intention formation (e.g., enact List 1; do not enact List 2) 
without further introduction. The second block was introduced as “second block” and the 
third block as “last block”. Thus the significance of a given block in terms of probability of a 
retrieval opportunity varied. For example, the information “second block” was rather 
irrelevant with regard to a retrieval opportunity because participants did not know how many 
blocks they were to complete. In contrast, “last block” signalled a retrieval opportunity in the 
very near future. If intentions are flexibly activated depending on the probability of an 
opportunity to complete the intention, one might expect a pronounced intention-superiority 
effect in the last block, but none in previous blocks when a retrieval opportunity is rather 
unlikely. In contrast, if intention-related materials are represented with a stronger or longer-
lasting level of activation as proposed by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) we should observe 
relatively stable intention-superiority effects across block.  
 To sum up, in Experiment 3 we compare response latencies for stimuli of the 
prospective and the neutral list across three blocks. In line with the persistence hypothesis we 
should observe an intention-superiority effect in the first block after intention formation, in 
the second one about two minutes later, and in the last one. If context information affects the 
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intention-superiority effect we should observe small reaction-time difference for the first and 
second blocks with a low probability of retrieval opportunity and a more increased intention-
superiority effect in the last block. Again, we expected similar patterns of results for an 
enactment and a monitoring condition.   
3.6.1 Method 
3.6.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-four undergraduates (age: 18 – 28 years, M = 21, SD = 2; 77% women) 
volunteered in exchange for course credit. Two participants were replaced because they 
forgot the intended task or indicated the wrong list. Sixteen students were randomly assigned 
to each task condition. 
3.6.1.2 Materials 
Study materials as well as recognition stimuli were taken from Experiment 4. In order 
to prolong the recognition test, the 48 stimuli (24 list words, 24 distracter words) were 
presented repeatedly in three blocks. The order of stimuli was randomized for each block. 
3.6.1.3 Procedure 
The general procedure was similar to Experiment 4. After seating the participant in 
front of the computer the experimenter went next door. First participants learned two lists of 
actions for a later (unspecified) memory test with the restriction that they should know which 
actions belonged to which list. The study materials were presented the same way as in 
Experiment 4. Presentation order of study lists was counterbalanced across participants. 
After the study phase, the recognition test and the performance task (enactment or 
monitoring) were shortly explained. Instructions were taken from Experiment 4. For the 
recognition test we added two sentences informing participants that the memory test 
consisted of several blocks with short breaks between the blocks and that they would receive 
information about their task progression during the breaks. The number of blocks was not 
specified. Again, to strengthen personal relevance of the future performance task participants 
were told that the experimenter would evaluate their enactment or monitoring performance, 
respectively. All participants were instructed to knock on the door of the adjacent room as 
soon as they had finished the recognition test. After these general instructions, participants 
were informed which list had to be performed or monitored, respectively, after the 
recognition test. In the upper third of the screen the words “After the memory task” were 
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displayed. After two seconds, the computer beeped and the instructions specifying the 
prospective and the neutral list appeared in two rows on the middle of the same screen. Both 
lists served equally often as prospective and neutral lists and the position of both lists was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Then the first block of the recognition test began. There were short breaks lasting five 
seconds between consecutive blocks. During breaks the information “Continuing soon!” and 
“Second [Last] block” appeared on the screen. The beginning and end of the breaks was 
announced with a signal tone. After the last trial of the recognition test, the word “End” 
appeared on the screen.  
When participants notified the experimenter, they were asked why they came. If 
participants indicated that they intended to carry out the performance in a nearby kitchen, 
they were thanked and debriefed.  
3.6.1.4 Design  
Independent variables were task (enactment vs. monitoring, between subjects), list 
(prospective vs. neutral, within subject) and recognition block (first, second, last, within 
subject). Main dependent variables were response latencies and hit rates in the recognition 
test.   
3.6.2 Results 
3.6.2.1 Preliminary Analyses  
All participants indicated the correct prospective list and the correct title, suggesting 
that participants understood the general topic of prospective list. Reading time for 
instructions concerning the recognition test and the performance task were similar for both 
types of task (M = 69.3, SD = 22.4 seconds for the enactment task and M = 71.4, SD = 17 
seconds for the monitoring task, t < 1).  
3.6.2.2 Recognition Task  
Individual outliers were determined for each block separately in Experiments 5 and 6. 
In Experiment 5, 10 % of the total number of trials were incorrect and 1 % were excluded as 
outliers. Table 2 presents mean response latencies and recognition accuracy. We analyzed 
log-transformed response latencies in a 2 (task) " 2 (list) " 3 (block) mixed ANOVA. Again, 
there were no significant effects involving the factor task, all Fs < 1.6. There was a main 
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effect of block, F(1,44) = 28.38, R2p = .45, and a main effect of list, F(1,30) = 12.44, R2p = 
.29, qualified by the expected list " block interaction, F(2,60) = 2.87, p = .06, R2p = .09. In 
line with the assumption of a context-sensitive activation of intentions, theoretically driven 
simple main effect tests showed an intention-superiority effect in the last block when a 
retrieval opportunity was near [M = 840 ms vs. M = 917 ms, F(1,30) = 8.74, R2p = .23], but 
no effect in the previous second block [M = 872 ms vs. M = 896 ms, simple main effect: F < 
1.4]. There was also an intention-superiority effect in the first block after intention formation 
[M = 938 ms vs. M = 1036 ms, simple main effect: F(1,30) = 12.84, R2p = .30].     
As in Experiment 4, recognition accuracy did not reflect a heightened accessibility of 
intention-related materials. A 2 (task) " 2 (list) " 3 (block) mixed ANOVA on hit rates 
revealed no significant effects, all Fs < 2.9. Specifically, neither the main effect of list, F < 
2.3, nor the list " block interaction, F < 1.3, was significant.   
  
 
Table 2. Mean Response Latencies and Hit Rates (with Standard Deviations) for Stimuli of the Prospective and the Neutral List, separately 
for Block and Task in Experiment 5. 
Block First  Second  Last 
List Prospective Neutral Prospective Neutral Prospective Neutral 
Task M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Response Latencies 
Enactment 944 (162) 1043 (256) 865 (168) 873 (196) 816 (138) 864 (148) 
Monitoring 931 (165) 1030 (257) 879 (220) 919 (252) 866 (178) 971 (301) 
Hits  
Enactment .93 (.12) .92 (.09) .94 (.09) .90 (.10) .91 (.08) .93 (.07) 
Monitoring .93 (.09) .86 (.09) .91 (.09) .87 (.12) .90 (.09) .88 (.12) 
Note. The first block started immediately after instructions specifying the prospective list and the neutral list. Between subsequent blocks 
were short breaks during which information concerning next block (second or last block) were displayed.
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3.6.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 5 we tested whether the level of activation of intention-related 
materials fluctuates within the ongoing activity as a function of the probability of the retrieval 
opportunity. In particular, we assumed a more pronounced intention-superiority effect in the 
last block prior to intention completion compared to the other blocks after which a retrieval 
opportunity was unlikely. In line with our assumption there was a reaction-time advantage for 
intention-related materials compared to neutral materials in the last block when a retrieval 
opportunity was proximate, but not in the previous second block. Interestingly, there was also 
an intention-superiority effect in the first block although the block itself was irrelevant with 
regard to a proximate retrieval opportunity. The first block was reacted to immediately after 
intention formation. After-effects of intention formation, for example planning or rehearsal, 
may have contributed to the intention-superiority effect in the first block (e.g., Altmann & 
Trafton, 2002). As the comparisons show these effects perished after a short delay. This 
finding contradicts the persistence hypothesis. In line with the findings of Experiment 4, even 
a short moment after intention formation latencies for prospective and neutral stimuli were 
comparable in the second block. In general, the latency data corroborate a context-sensitive 
activation of intentions. Yet, there was a small descriptive intention-superiority effect in the 
second block (24 ms) and the effect size of the crucial interaction of list and block was not 
very large. For replication a third experiment was conducted.  
In hindsight the manipulation of task progression or the probability of the retrieval 
opportunity was not perfect. Although we informed participants that they would perform 
several blocks of the recognition test with breaks in which they would receive information 
about task progression, the instructions were rather vague on how they could use this 
information. When testing the comprehensibility of instructions we also asked how many 
blocks participants expected after such instructions. People guessed that the recognition test 
would last three or more blocks. Therefore we simply assumed that participants would not 
expect a retrieval opportunity after the second block when told that the recognition test 
consists of several blocks. Yet we did not explicitly assess participants’ expectations. In 
Experiment 6 we gave more specific instructions what to expect and how to interpret the 
information during the breaks.  
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3.7 Experiment 6 
The main aim of Experiment 6 was to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 
5 using another set of stimuli. In this experiment actions of both lists were related to a 
common context (office-related actions) making a distinction between prospective and 
neutral stimuli more difficult (see also Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, Experiment 2).  
We modified the instructions concerning how to use information about task 
progression between blocks of the recognition task. The cover story was that we were 
interested in participants’ ability to improve recognition performance across several blocks. 
We explained that the recognition test consisted of several blocks and that the exact number 
of to-be-completed blocks would depend on one’s recognition performance. If one achieved a 
certain level of recognition accuracy there would be only one other block to test the stability 
of the achieved performance level. During the breaks between blocks one could check if this 
special block began. The words “Last block” were not mentioned in these instructions. All 
participants completed four blocks irrespective of their recognition performance. This 
allowed us to explore the pattern of activation for stimuli of the prospective and neutral list 
more closely across blocks. 
Compared to Experiment 5, several details of the general procedure were changed. 
First, the order of task explanations and study phase was exchanged. Participants read 
explanations concerning the recognition test and the performance task before the study phase.  
Consequently, they were aware of what kind of information was needed for the memory task 
and that they additionally were either asked to execute (enactment task) or to monitor the 
execution (monitoring task) of one of the two study lists after the recognition test when 
studying the lists. As in our previous experiments for both types of tasks it was stressed that 
the experimenter would evaluate participants’ performance. In order to avoid strategic 
encoding the type of task and the prospective list was only specified after the study phase. 
Another consequence of this change of presentation order was the addition of a delay task 
between study phase and the start of the recognition test. Participants solved maths problems 
for two minutes. Thus, in contrast to Experiment 4-5, in which the delay between study phase 
and recognition task varied with participants’ reading time, the delay interval was held 
constant across participants. Second, study lists had titles (“tidying up the desk”, “clearing 
away materials”) instead of being called List 1 and List 2. Since both study lists consisted of 
actions that could be summarized as tidying up or clearing away, it was rather difficult to 
strategically rehearse specific list contents during the short interval specifying the prospective 
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list and the beginning of the recognition test. We were interested whether we could still 
observe an intention-superiority effect in the first block. Third, during intention formation the 
instructions specifying the type of task and the prospective list (e.g. “enact tidying up the 
desk”) and the neutral list (e.g. “do not enact clearing away materials”) were presented in two 
rows without specifically mentioning when to realize the task. In other words, participants 
had to remind themselves to perform the enactment or monitoring task after completing the 
recognition test. The retrieval opportunity (after the memory task) was last specified before 
the study phase (about nine minutes before). Finally, all participants realized the denoted task 
after the recognition test. We assessed free recall for both task conditions. Participants in the 
enactment condition were asked to carry out the prospective list. Participants in the 
monitoring condition made a checklist with all actions the person was supposed to carry out 
before monitoring a videotaped performance. Free recall differed between task conditions 
only concerning the mode of recall (motor or verbal). The recall situation was identical: All 
objects listed in both study lists (and distracter objects) were present during recall. 
We expected to replicate the findings of Experiment 5. In line with a context 
hypothesis we should observe an intention-superiority effect in the fourth (last) block when a 
retrieval opportunity was expected, but not in the previous blocks when the retrieval 
opportunity was unlikely. The type of task (enactment or monitoring) should not affect the 
described pattern of latency data.  
3.7.1 Method 
3.7.1.1 Participants  
Seventy-four participants were recruited on campus (age: 18 – 28 years, M = 21, SD = 
2; 77% women). Three participants were replaced due to severe language problems and 
another seven participants because they forgot the performance task or failed to indicate the 
correct prospective list. Of the remaining 64 participants half was assigned to each task 
condition.  
3.7.1.2 Materials  
Two new study lists were constructed, each describing eight office-related actions 
(e.g. file a letter; see Appendix C). Lists were entitled as “tidying up the desk” and “clearing 
away materials”. The recognition test consisted of the 24 task words (six nouns and six verbs 
from each list) and 24 distracter words (12 related to the office context, 12 unrelated). The 
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whole set of stimuli was presented repeatedly in different random orders in each of the four 
blocks.  
3.7.1.3 Procedure  
All instructions were presented on a computer screen. At the beginning the math 
distracter task, the recognition test, and the subsequent performance task were explained. We 
told participants that they should perform several blocks of the recognition test and that they 
would be informed when the recognition test was going to end soon. Instructions for the 
performance task indicated that the task could be realized after the recognition test. 
Participants were asked to notify the experimenter as soon as they had finished the 
recognition test. The experimenter was in the same room during the whole experiment, but 
out of sight behind a partition wall. To strengthen the perceived relevance of the performance 
task we announced an immediate feedback from the experimenter.  
The study phase was similar to Experiments 4-5. First the list title and each action 
appeared on the screen separately for five seconds, then the whole list was presented for 
another 30 seconds. Then the second list was presented. Both lists were shown alternately 
three times. The order of both lists was counterbalanced across participants. Next the math 
distracter task started. Participants saw two equations (e.g. 14 – 6 = and 6 + 3 =) on the left 
and right side of the screen. They indicated with a key press which equation had the higher 
result (“y” for the left and “n” for the right equation). After two minutes the computer 
beeped. Then information specifying the task (enact or observe) and the prospective and 
neutral list were presented for three seconds in two rows in the middle of the screen. The 
retrieval context (after the recognition test) was not mentioned. Next the recognition test 
started. Trial design was identical to our previous experiments. Wrong decisions were 
indicated with a beep. Breaks between blocks began and ended with a distinctive tone and 
lasted five seconds. During breaks the information “Continuing soon” and “Second  [third; 
last] block” appeared on the screen. After the last trial the word “End” remained on the 
screen.  
When participants went to the experimenter they were asked whether the experiment 
was finished. If they said no the experimenter asked what type of task and which list they 
intended to carry out in the performance task. If they gave the correct answer they went with 
experimenter to another part of the room. Behind a partition wall all materials needed to 
execute the actions as well distracter objects were put on two desks. These desks were not 
visible during the study phase or recognition test. Participants in the enactment condition 
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carried out all actions of the prospective list they remembered and the experimenter recorded 
their recall. Participants in the monitoring condition expected to monitor a videotaped 
performance of the respective list. Beforehand they were asked to write down all actions of 
the prospective list. When they indicated that they could not remember any more actions, the 
experimenter gave them a differently coloured pen. This way we could easily see if 
participants added any other actions during or after watching the video. We counted only the 
number of correctly recalled actions before watching the video.  
3.7.2 Results 
3.7.2.1 Preliminary Analyses  
In the enactment condition the number of correctly performed actions was counted. In 
the monitoring condition the number of verbally recalled actions before videotape 
presentation was counted. Free recall of the prospective list did not differ between the 
enactment task (M = 6.5) and the monitoring task (M = 6.7), t < 1. All participants recalled at 
least four out of eight actions.  
3.7.2.2 Recognition Task 
In Experiment 6, 15 % of all trials were incorrect and 1.7 % were classified as 
outliers. Table 3 presents mean latencies and recognition accuracy for both types of list 
stimuli across blocks. Response latencies were analyzed in a 2 (task) ! 2 (list) ! 4 (block) 
mixed ANOVA. Again, no effects involving the factor task were significant, all Fs < 1.2. The 
main effect of block, F(2,142) = 19.35, R2p = .24, the main effect of list, F(1,62) = 29.25, R2p 
= .32, and the predicted list ! block interaction, F(3,186) = 9.33, R2p = .13, were significant. 
As in Experiment 5, prospective stimuli were faster recognized than neutral stimuli in the 
first block immediately after intention formation [M = 961 ms vs. M = 1077 ms, simple main 
effect: F(1,62) = 35.60, R2p = .37] and in the last block prior intention execution [M = 876 ms 
vs. M = 961 ms, simple main effect: F(1,62) = 38.73, R2p = .38]. In line with a context 
hypothesis response latencies were comparable for the centre blocks [M = 949 ms vs. M = 
965, simple main effect: F < 2.1 for the second block and M = 943 ms vs. M= 952 ms, simple 
main effect: F < 1 for the third block, respectively]. 
To gain further information about the activation of prospective and neutral stimuli 
across blocks we computed pairwise (Sidak-adjusted) comparisons. Comparisons for stimuli 
of the prospective list indicated that these stimuli were recognized particularly fast in the last 
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block compared to the previous blocks in which a heightened accessibility of intention-
related information was rather irrelevant (M = 961 ms for the first block, M = 949 ms for the 
second block, M = 941 ms for the third block, and M = 876 ms for the last block, 
respectively). Response latencies for neutral list stimuli were slower in the first block relative 
to later blocks, which did not differ from each other (M = 1077 ms for the first block, M = 
965 ms for the second block, M = 952 ms for the third block, and M = 961 ms for the last 
block, respectively).   
For accuracy data, the 2 (task) ! 2 (list) ! 4 (block) mixed ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of block, F(3,186) = 8.81, R2p = .12. There was a small increase in hit rate across 
blocks (M = .81 for the first, M = .83 for the second, M = .86 for the third, and M = .86 for the 
last block). Again neither the main effect of list nor any interactions involving this factor 
were significant, all Fs < 2.5.   
  
Table 3. Mean Response Latencies and Hit Rates (with Standard Deviations) for Stimuli of the Prospective and the Neutral List, separately 
for Block and Task in Experiment 6. 
 
Block First  Second  Third Last 
List Prospective Neutral Prospective Neutral Prospective Neutral Prospective Neutral 
Task M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) (SD) M (SD) (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Response Latencies                 
Enactment 955 (185) 1056 (226) 943 (239) 954 (168) 952 (201) 955 (203) 861 (153) 913 (161) 
Monitoring 968 (210) 1090 (316) 956 (212) 978 (233) 935 (215) 950 (233) 891 (314) 1008 (422) 
Hits                  
Enactment .83 (.14) .83 (.13) .82 (.15) .84 (.10) .89 (.11) .83 (.13) .88 (.11) .84 (.12) 
Monitoring .82 (.11) .77 (.16) .83 (.12) .84 (.10) .85 (.14) .85 (.08) .85 (.13) .86 (.10) 
Note. The first block started immediately after instructions specifying the prospective list and the neutral list. Between subsequent blocks 
were short breaks during which information concerning next block (second, third, or last block) were displayed.
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3.7.3 Discussion 
Again, the overall pattern of results corroborates our hypothesis of a context-sensitive 
activation of intention-related materials. As in Experiment 5 the size of the intention-
superiority effect varied with the proximity of a retrieval opportunity: We demonstrated an 
intention-superiority effect in the last block prior to intention execution, but not in centre 
blocks when a retrieval opportunity was unlikely. Again there was a large intention-
superiority effect in the first block immediately after intention formation, but the effect 
vanished quickly. As in our previous experiments the type of intended task (enactment vs. 
observation) did not influence the intention-superiority effect. 
Pairwise comparisons of latencies for prospective and neutral stimuli respectively 
suggest that different mechanisms support the intention-superiority effect in the first and last 
block. Prospective stimuli were accessible particularly fast when a retrieval opportunity was 
proximate, but not in previous blocks which were irrelevant with regard to intention 
completion. This finding nicely fits our assumption of a context-sensitive activation: 
Intention-related stimuli are easily accessible if a retrieval opportunity is likely, that is, if a 
heightened accessibility is functional for successful remembering of intentions. In contrast, 
recognition latencies for neutral stimuli were slower in the first block compared to the 
following blocks. Since participants were only told not to perform the neutral list, one 
explanation is that stimuli of the cancelled list were shortly inhibited (Marsh et al., 1999). 
Findings by Förster et al. (2005) suggest that the inhibition of completed intentions is short-
lived (but see Penningroth, 2011). A similar inhibitory mechanism may work for 
uncompleted, but cancelled intentions as used in the current experiment.  
3.8 General Discussion 
Starting point of the present research was the notion that context information may 
allow a flexible activation and deactivation of intentions. In line with this assumption 
Experiment 4 shows an intention-superiority effect (i.e., heightened activation of intention-
related words) in a recognition test only if the task was associated with a (proximate) retrieval 
opportunity. Experiments 5-6 demonstrate further that the accessibility of intention-related 
information varies within a task associated with a retrieval opportunity as a function of the 
probability or proximity of the retrieval occasion. If the retrieval opportunity was rather 
unlikely to occur or more distant there was no intention-superiority effect (except 
immediately after reading the instruction during the first block of trials). If simple cues (e.g., 
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“last block”) signalled that the intention could be realized soon there was an intention-
superiority effect.  
Our finding that the intention-superiority effect occurred in the last block, but not in 
the preceding one(s), is in line with the notion of a (gradually) increasing accessibility of 
intentions before intention completion (e.g., Dörner, 1984; Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007; 
Martin & Tesser, 1996; Sellen, Louie, Harris, & Wilkins, 1997). However, in our paradigm 
the manipulation of the level of retrieval proximity was rather coarse. Before the information 
“last block” participants were not able to estimate the proximity of the retrieval opportunity. 
A more fine-grained picture would emerge if the role of a gradually increasing proximity of 
the retrieval context was more closely examined.  
We argue that participants’ expectations about the likelihood or the perceived 
proximity of a retrieval opportunity modify the accessibility of intentions. Environmental 
cues such as arriving in a context associated with an intention (Experiment 4) or task 
progression (Experiments 5-6) could provide the information needed to evaluate the 
proximity of a retrieval opportunity. A heightened accessibility of intentions during time 
intervals in which the probability of occurrence of the specified retrieval event is high may 
improve the chances of actual intention completion. Thus, from a functional point of view a 
heightened accessibility of intention-related materials would not be necessary during the first 
of many blocks, but still we found such an effect. This raises the question whether the same 
processes contribute to an intention-superiority effect in the first and last block. A heightened 
activation of intention-related materials immediately after intention formation may reflect 
encoding processes, whereas the same effect in the last block may reflect retrieval-related 
processes, for example, monitoring.  
There are some parallels between the intention-superiority effect in associated 
retrieval contexts in our experiments and research on task interference by Marsh and 
colleagues (Cook, et al., 2005; Marsh, Hicks, et al., 2006; Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2008). For 
example, Marsh, Hicks, and Cook (2006) examined task interference of keeping a time-based 
intention when working on a lexical-decision task. They observed slower responses to neutral 
stimuli relative to a no-intention control condition across two blocks of the lexical-decision 
task if the retrieval context was ill defined (i.e., press a specific key in about six minutes). If, 
however, participants received the additional information that the response window would 
occur in the second block, task interference effects were restricted to the respective block. 
Some authors attribute task interference effects to monitoring processes: To some extent 
attentional resources are devoted to the detection of intention-related information during a 
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delay interval (e.g., Guynn, 2003; Smith, 2003, 2008). Recently, Smith (2008) suggested that 
such monitoring processes could be restricted to intervals in which a retrieval opportunity is 
likely. In line with this reasoning we demonstrated an intention-superiority effect under 
conditions associated with a retrieval opportunity.   
 Similarly, the current findings nicely fit the context-switching account of the 
intention-superiority effect that Lebiere and Lee (2002) proposed using the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). The main idea behind their modelling studies 
was that uncompleted intentions provide the context for the current goal, priming the 
respective memory items. “If a task is expected to be performed in the near future (and no 
other pressing one is currently being performed) then the context is set to that task to 
facilitate the retrieval of related information” (p. 62). In line with the brackets in that citation, 
our findings demonstrate that the task preceding the intention needs to be taken into account 
in the goal-activation process. We suppose that it activates the context. However, as we 
demonstrated, if it is not associated with the intended task because there is an intervening 
task or additional blocks of trials serve as pressing tasks before “the near future”, then no 
extra activation of intention-related stimuli can be observed. Those authors had already 
acknowledged that it is clearly not possible that prospective tasks remain activated until the 
time to perform them if longer time intervals in a busy schedule are concerned. In relation to 
the secondary aim of the present research, those authors had hypothesized that the context is 
set only to a to-be-performed task, but not to a “less demanding observe condition” (p. 62). 
Going beyond that, our findings demonstrate that a monitoring (i.e. observe) condition can 
indeed lead to equivalent findings as a performance condition as soon as it is not perceived as 
less demanding. This can easily be incorporated into their model by assuming that the context 
is set to any task that appears important, performance or monitoring. 
An explanation for the increased activation that we observed after intention formation 
was suggested by Altmann and Trafton (2002). They assume that participants use the short 
time at intention formation in which the prospective list is presented to strategically rehearse 
the topic of the more important prospective list. In line with this account in Experiments 5-6 
we found a large intention-superiority effect immediately after intention formation that 
decreased quickly after the first block when the intention was irrelevant. Similarly, Dockree 
and Ellis (2001) reported an intention-superiority effect after intention encoding although the 
retrieval opportunity was far away and the response-latency task itself was no relevant cue 
for a retrieval opportunity. Taken together, these findings indicate that intentions appear to be 
strongly activated immediately after they have been formed, and then again when the context 
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signals a retrieval opportunity. Altmann and Trafton’s (2002) account may also explain the 
re-appearing intention-superiority effect in the last block of Experiments 5-6 as well as an 
intention-superiority effect in the proximate-retrieval condition in Experiment 4: The break 
before the first trial was long enough to (partially) rehearse the prospective list. In line with 
this idea, a recent study on time-based intentions showed that participants tend to check the 
clock more often during breaks than within an ongoing task (Occhionero, Esposito, Cicogna, 
& Nigro, 2010). Future research should systematically examine the relationship between the 
temporal proximity of intention formation, the assessment of activation, and the association 
of the respective task with a retrieval context. At present we may conclude that an intention-
superiority effect immediately after intention formation is short-lived.  
We cannot rule out that strategic rehearsal processes before the first and last block 
contributed to the observed level of activation. (Even if the comparable response latencies for 
centre blocks compared to the last block suggests that participants adapted intention rehearsal 
to task requirements.) For several reasons we think the demonstrated intention-superiority 
effects are more than activation after strategic rehearsal. First, our study material was 
constructed in a way to make a detailed rehearsal of actions unlikely. For example, in 
Experiment 6 the titles for both lists were rather interchangeable (filing a letter away could be 
described as clearing something away or as tidying up the desk). In Experiments 5-6 we 
avoided naming the topic of each list (e.g. brewing coffee). Lists were simply labelled List 1 
and 2. Thus a conscious rehearsal of the intention-related actions included something like 
‘List 1’ = ‘making a sandwich’ = ‘to slice a bun’, to smear butter on it’ etc. This should have 
at least slowed down strategic rehearsal activities. Second, if participants rehearsed the topic 
of the prospective list, they should also have more difficulties to reject distracter stimuli 
related to the prospective list compared to distracters of the neutral list. However, neither 
response latencies nor false alarm rates differed for prospective and neutral distracter stimuli 
in Experiments 4 or 5 (see Footnote 3). Finally, other findings such as an intention-
superiority effect for lists of unrelated actions (Marsh et al., 1999) or similar intention-
superiority effects for participants who report a biased rehearsal of the prospective list and 
those who report similar rehearsal of both lists before a recognition test (Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993) also suggest that the intention-superiority effect is due to more than strategic rehearsal.  
Our results are not easily compatible with the notion of persistently activated 
intentions (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 1996). In Experiments 5 and 6 the intention-superiority 
effect vanished quickly after intention formation. Experiment 4 suggests that intentions do 
not remain active after intention formation until the intention is fulfilled, but are re-activated 
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in a context-sensitive way when a retrieval opportunity is approached. Future research should 
examine whether other types of intentions reveal a similar pattern. For several reasons in the 
present research we focused on activity-based intentions. First, most experiments that 
examined an intention-superiority effect also used instructions that we can summarize as 
activity based. In general, participants were simply instructed to do something after the 
recognition test or the lexical-decision task. Second, task requirements for detecting the 
activity-based retrieval opportunity are minimal (e.g., Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996; ; but see 
McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). One may rely on external cues that signal an approaching 
retrieval opportunity. In addition, in contrast to time-based intentions that require an 
interruption of the ongoing task at a specific moment in time or event-based intentions that 
require the interruption of the task when a particular stimulus occurs, an activity-based 
retrieval context is embedded in different activities, for example in our paradigm between the 
recognition test and the end of the experiment. Keeping the intention active during the 
retention interval is not necessary. It would have been sufficient to check for unfulfilled tasks 
after completing the recognition task. Still, some attentional resources seem to be allocated to 
the prospective list before a retrieval opportunity occurs. Finally, using activity-based 
intentions offered a nice way to vary the proximity of a retrieval context without initiating 
other processes such as time monitoring. Future research should examine whether the 
reported results are restricted to activity-based intentions. For example, in laboratory event-
based intentions a retrieval context is also based on external stimuli. Yet these stimuli are 
embedded in a continuous activity. The probability of a retrieval opportunity could be more 
difficult to estimate within the activity. This may result in a more persistent activation of the 
intention. Time-based intentions provide the fewest external cues concerning when an 
appropriate moment to realize the intention appears. It has been suggested that time-based 
intentions are represented on a higher level of activation than other types of intentions (e.g., 
Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007; Sellen, et al., 1997). Again this may result in a more persistent 
activation of time-based intentions relative to other types of intentions. Another important 
factor may be whether participants are able to specify a retrieval context further when 
encountering associated task (e.g., to re-define the context “after the memory task” into “after 
the final block of this task”). 
Freeman and Ellis (2003b) proposed that the encoding of motor information 
contributes to the accessibility of intended actions. Replicating an intention-superiority effect, 
actions encoded verbally for future enactment were faster recognized than actions encoded 
verbally for future verbal recall. However, actions enacted at encoding did not additionally 
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benefit from the enactment intention. Latencies for actions enacted at encoding for future 
enactment were comparable to latencies for actions enacted at encoding for future verbal 
recall in their studies. If motor information were crucial we should have observed intention-
superiority effects in the enactment task, but not in the monitoring task. In none of the three 
experiments did we find differences between task conditions. This extends a previous set of 
experiments that demonstrated an intention-superiority effect irrespective of the type of task 
if the intended task was personally relevant, but not for a personally irrelevant task (Schult & 
Steffens, in press). It extends the finding of comparable results for different types of intended 
tasks to another type of assessment (recognition test instead of lexical-decision test) and a 
more subtle manipulation of personal relevance. Expectation of a feedback from another 
person (Experiment 6) or the knowledge that the other person will form an impression 
(Experiments 4-5) seems sufficient to induce a feeling of personal relevance. In sum, motor 
recall is no pre-condition for a heightened accessibility of intention-related concepts. 
3.9 Conclusion 
At this very moment, among the intentions that I have formed for today, but currently 
postponed, are those to feed the pet turkey for dinner; make a phone call in two hours; post a 
letter; buy three different train tickets for next week; check my checking account online; 
write three e-mails; and check my calendar to see when tonight’s appointment starts. This list 
could be considerably extended, and other intentions have been formed for the week, month, 
and even year. The clever paradigms that psychologists have invented in order to study the 
cognitive representation of intentions have so far demonstrated the increased accessibility of 
short-term delayed intentions across an intervening task. However, a cognitive system 
extending this activity level across hours or even longer would be highly dysfunctional. In 
line with this notion, as we have shown, even short-term activity-based intentions are flexibly 
activated and deactivated depending on the proximity of a retrieval opportunity. 
Environmental details are used to gain such information (Smith, 2008). A heightened 
accessibility of delayed intentions in moments in which a retrieval opportunity is likely to 
occur increases the chances that the opportunity is detected, improving the probability of 
intention completion. Such a flexible accessibility of intentions is highly functional whenever 
execution has to be considerably postponed. 
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4 Final Discussion 
One crucial question in prospective memory research is what brings the representation 
of a previously formed intention into one’s mind at the right moment given there are no 
explicit prompts to initiate retrieval processes. Already Lewin (1926) suggested that intended 
activities may enjoy a special storage status in memory until the are fulfilled. In other words, 
intentions may enjoy a heightened level of activation or enhanced accessibility compared to 
other memory contents. For example, with a heightened accessibility intentions may pop into 
one’s mind when a previously specified retrieval opportunity is encountered. An enhanced 
accessibility may also lead to periodic recollections of the intention during the retention 
interval, which in turn may trigger monitoring processes, and consequently increase the 
probability of detecting an opportunity to realize the intention. In short, a heightened 
availability of intentions would be highly functional for supporting successful prospective 
remembering. The postponed-intention paradigm as introduced by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) 
offers an approach to investigate the accessibility of intention-related materials in the 
intervening period between encoding and retrieval of intentions. In the following we first 
discuss the theoretical implications of each finding. Then we will highlight some general 
limitations of the used paradigm and indicate future research strategies. 
4.1 The Role of Intent  
Consistent across six experiments we demonstrated an intention-superiority effect (i.e. 
faster response latencies for reactions to stimuli associated with a future task relative to 
stimuli associated with no or a cancelled task) for different types of task when task realization 
has personally relevant consequences in terms of a performance evaluation. This effect was 
found in a lexical-decision task (Experiments 1-3) as well as a recognition task (Experiments 
4-6) using different materials. The type of intended tasks varied between experiments, 
ranging from grading a written report (Experiments 2-3) to monitoring someone’s enactment 
performance (Experiments 1-2; Experiments 4-6) and carrying out a list of actions 
(Experiments 1, 3-6). As Experiment 3 clearly shows, participants’ expectations concerning 
the relevance of the intended task are more important than the type of intended task. We 
found an intention-superiority effect when the denoted task was relevant in terms of an 
outcome evaluation. In contrast, we found no intention-superiority effect when future task 
had no personally relevant consequences for participants. Taken together, the intentional 
status of materials was more important than specific properties of the intended task. This 
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implies that the intention-superiority effect is not restricted to to-be-executed actions, but 
generally occurs for (momentarily) relevant plans. 
The finding of an intention-superiority effect independent of the type of task is not 
easily compatible with Freeman and Ellis’ (2003b; Ellis & Freeman, 2008) notion that this 
effect reflects the availability of motor information. In detail, these authors argued that the 
reaction-time advantage for to-be-enacted actions (i.e. the intention-superiority effect) in a 
postponed-intention paradigm is functionally similar to an enactment-encoding effect (e.g., 
Engelkamp, 1998, for a review on enactment encoding). The general idea is that actions 
verbally encoded for future enactment elicit similar representations as actions carried out 
during encoding. In both cases motor-relevant information is activated that facilitates recall. 
Consistent with this hypothesis Freeman and Ellis reported comparable recognition latencies 
for verbs that were enacted at encoding and intended for verbal recall (enactment-encoding 
task) and verbs verbally encoded with the intention of enactment at recall (prospective 
enactment task). In both encoding conditions verbs were faster recognized than in a no-motor 
control condition (verbal encoding with the intention of future verbal recall or a verbal 
encoding for recognition only). Thus, materials were more easily accessible if a motor 
response was necessary at encoding or intended at retrieval. In addition, once motor-relevant 
information was activated at encoding, the intention to execute these actions at a future 
moment did not increase the accessibility of intention-related stimuli any further.  
In the current research we did not manipulate the type of encoding. All participants 
encoded the lists of actions by reading and the type of intended task was specified after study 
phase. Following Freeman and Ellis’ (2003b; Ellis & Freeman, 2008)  line of reasoning we 
should have found a reaction-time advantage only for such actions participants intended to 
carry out at some future moment. The intention-superiority effect should have been restricted 
to prospective enactment tasks. In contrast, we found an intention-superiority effect for an 
enactment task as well as a variety of other tasks that did not require an overt motor response 
when an evaluation was expected. In addition, we found no intention-superiority effect for an 
enactment task when this task had no personally relevant consequences for participants 
(Experiment 3). The finding of a context-sensitive intention-superiority effect (Experiments 
4-6) also challenges the notion that this effect is mainly due to encoding and storage of motor 
information. Once encoded, motor information should have been available independent of the 
moment of assessment. Thus, our findings indicate that the intention-superiority effect 
reflects the intentional quality of these materials rather than motor information. If materials 
are associated with personally relevant consequences (here: outcome evaluation), then they 
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are stored at a heightened level of activation. The findings of Chapter 3 suggest that 
expectation of a feedback from another person (Experiment 6) or the knowledge that the 
other person will form an impression (Experiments 4-5) is sufficient to induce such a feeling 
of personal relevance.  
Announcing an outcome evaluation may contribute in different ways to the intention-
superiority effect. First, it may guarantee that participants form an intention. As outlined in 
the Introduction, some researchers restrict the term intention to future tasks participants have 
decided on and are committed to perform (in contrast to mere wishing) (e.g., Goschke & 
Kuhl, 1993; Goschke & Kuhl, 1996; Smith, 2008). Expecting an outcome evaluation might 
be a pre-condition to elicit a feeling of commitment for intentions as used in a postponed-
intention paradigm. Typically, the intention is a request from an experimenter and is of little 
or no personal relevance for participants’ long-term aims and goals. Without an outcome 
evaluation participants may formally agree to comply with such a request, but it does not 
necessarily imply that participants formed an intention to do so (cf. Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 
1996). In contrast, if the intended task is associated with an outcome evaluation participants 
have to comply. This reasoning may explain why there was no intention-superiority effect for 
an observation task without outcome evaluation in previous studies (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 
Marsh, et al., 1998) or when participants expected a written copy of the to-be-executed 
actions during retrieval (Dockree & Ellis, 2001). It may also give an explanation for our null 
finding in Experiment 3 when participants were told that the intention could be performed 
anonymously. Yet, such a strategy did not reflect in ratings of task importance (“A good 
performance at the task is … 1 “not at all important” – 7 “very important”). Ratings were 
comparable for participants who expected an outcome evaluation or none, and individual 
importance ratings did not correlate with the size of the intention-superiority effect (!r!s < 
.07). In addition, this reasoning does not explain the absence of an intention-superiority effect 
for verbal recall tasks as used in Freeman and Ellis’ (2003b) research. In these studies 
participants were asked to orally recall a list of previously learned verbs in the presence of an 
experimenter. Although the intended task was clearly associated with an outcome evaluation 
there was no intention-superiority effect for verbs associated with verbal recall relative to 
verbs with no intention.  
We assume that the announcement of an outcome evaluation increases the importance 
or strength of this intention. Personal importance as well as consequences of failure and 
anticipated benefits of success for one self or others influence the probability of remembering 
an intention (e.g., Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2008; Ellis & Freeman, 2008, for reviews). 
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Introducing an outcome evaluation is a means to link a rather unimportant intention with 
personally relevant consequences. Thus, announcing an outcome evaluation may increase 
participants’ effort to encode and store these intentions, which in turn could reflect in faster 
response latencies. Participants’ beliefs about task requirements (as well as the general tone 
of task instructions) may affect to what extent a feeling of personal relevance is established. 
This might also explain the absence of an intention-superiority effect for a verbal task in 
Freeman and Ellis (2003b) research. Although there was an outcome evaluation, the task of 
recalling a list of verbs could be interpreted as less personally important compared to 
pantomimic enactment at recall. Against this explanation speaks that the intention-superiority 
effect was not related to ratings on negative feelings about the anticipated task performance 
(Experiment 1). Also, there were no reliable differences in task-importance ratings for 
participants with and without outcome evaluation (Experiment 3). However, these 
importance ratings might not be reliable proxies for the consequences of task realization in 
terms of an evaluation. It is well known that evaluation apprehension and related variables 
such as expectancies of negative evaluations or the tendency to avoid criticism affects task 
performance and memory (e.g., Cottrell, 1968; Geen, 1991, for reviews). Similar factors may 
contribute to the encoding, storage and retrieval of delayed intentions. Thus, social-emotional 
factors such as needs to avoid criticism or negative evaluations might be more appropriate 
variables to explain differences in the size of the intention-superiority effect. In addition, 
importance ratings were assessed at the end of the experiment after cancelling (Experiment 1) 
or completing (Experiments 2-3) the intended activity. Thus, ratings might not reflect 
feelings prior task completion.  
At the present we cannot disentangle whether the announcement of an outcome 
evaluation forced participants to form an intention per se or rather increased the strength of 
this intention. The intentions used in this research are best described as experimenter-defined 
“musts”. Whether the intention-superiority effect is restricted to such obligations with 
outcome evaluation or generalizes to other types of intentions (e.g., wants), as suggested by 
Ellis (1996), remains to be tested. Ellis outlined a number of factors that modify the strength 
of an intention. For example, the origin of an intention (self or other), the primary beneficiary 
(self or other), and the relative importance of other persons may contribute to the importance 
of an intention (see also Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996). Thus far, laboratory-based tasks 
demonstrating an intention-superiority effect were experimenter-defined and associated with 
an (implicit or explicit) outcome evaluation. Future research should focus on other influential 
factors, for example the role of incentives. Research by Förster et al. (2005, Experiment 5) 
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suggests a rather complex relationship between (monetary) incentives and the accessibility of 
intention-related information.  
4.2 The Role of the Retrieval Cue 
Some authors interpreted the intention-superiority effect as a phenomenon of 
encoding. They attributed a heightened availability of intention-related information to the 
intentional status of this materials (e.g., Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, 1996), motor information 
(e.g., Ellis & Freeman, 2008; Freeman & Ellis, 2003b), or rehearsal processes at encoding 
(e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2002). The demonstration of intention-superiority effects 
immediately after intention encoding in Experiments 5-6 support this notion. The quick 
vanishing of the effect also indicates that the intention-superiority effect may reflect strategic 
encoding or rehearsal processes (e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Ellis & Freeman, 2008) 
rather than a nonstrategic phenomenon (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, 1996).  
More interestingly, we also found an intention-superiority effect in periods associated 
with a retrieval opportunity. In Experiment 4 we manipulated whether a recognition test 
indicated a near retrieval opportunity or not. We observed an intention-superiority effect only 
if the task itself was a meaningful cue for a near retrieval opportunity. In Experiments 5-6 we 
manipulated the proximity of a retrieval opportunity within a recognition test. Besides an 
intention-superiority effect in the first block after intention formation, we found an intention-
superiority effect the last block prior to intention realization, but not in preceding centre 
blocks. In sum, these findings indicate that even short-term delayed intentions are flexibly 
activated and deactivated depending on the proximity of a retrieval opportunity.      
Ellis (1996) made an important distinction between a retention interval in which an 
intention must be retained and a performance interval in which an intention can be realized. 
Findings of Chapter 3 indicate a heightened accessibility of intention-related information 
during a performance interval. The critical retrieval occasion, that is, the end of the 
recognition task, had to occur at some moment in the task (Experiment 4) or the last block of 
the task (Experiments 5-6). The finding nicely extends previous research that demonstrated 
task interference effects of holding an intention on the processing of ongoing activities during 
previously specified performance intervals (e.g., Marsh, Cook, et al., 2006; Marsh, Hicks, et 
al., 2006; see also Marsh, et al., 2008, for review). Typically, task interference effects (i.e. a 
slowing of response latencies in an ongoing activity compared to a no-intention control 
condition) are interpreted as a result of a biased allocation of attentional resources towards 
the processing of intention-related stimuli. The reported intention-superiority effect during 
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performance intervals supports this notion more directly (see also Hicks, Marsh, & Cook, 
2005).  
In the current research we assessed the accessibility of information related to the 
action component of an intention. A heightened availability of such information when a 
retrieval cue (a performance interval) is present may support the successful retrieval of the 
intended activity. Yet, whether the enhanced accessibility of this information also supports 
prospective memory performance remains to be established. Results of Chapter 3 also 
indicate that retrieval cues trigger the activation of action-related information. It remains to 
be established whether a similar pattern of results occurs for the cue component. Prospective 
memory requires that a given situation is recognized as a potential performance interval. 
Thus, a heightened accessibility of information related to the cue component might be more 
persistent than the accessibility of action-related information (e.g., Ellis & Freeman, 2008). 
For example, Förster et al. (2005) observed an increasing reaction-time advantage for 
information related to the cue component across blocks. Yet, in this research the response-
latency task always signalled a potential retrieval opportunity, that is a performance interval, 
in the very near future. Whether information related to the cue component is also more easily 
available during a retention interval remains to be tested.  
4.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
One question is whether an intention-superiority effect as revealed in a lexical-
decision task (Experiments 1-3) or a recognition task (Experiments 4-6) is also linked with 
performance in prospective memory tasks. A key feature of prospective tasks is the self-
initiated retrieval of the intention. For experiments described in Chapter 2 one may argue that 
the intended tasks were no real prospective memory tasks. Instructions concerning the 
retrieval condition were rather vague and we do not know whether or what type of cue 
participants expected from the experimenter. If they expected a reminder, this may limit our 
results. For experiments reported in Chapter 3 participants had to remind themselves to notify 
the experimenter that they were ready to realize the intended activity. Technically, one may 
argue that notifying the experimenter was another prospective task than executing or 
monitoring the prospective list of actions for which we assessed response latencies. Yet, we 
think that both tasks were highly associated, and thus the intended activity (enactment or 
monitoring) could be described as prospective task. Yet, our argument would be stronger if 
we demonstrated an intention-superiority effect for tasks participants had to initiate without 
previously notifying the experimenter (e.g., Dockree & Ellis, 2001, for an example).  
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A more critical issue is whether intention superiority supports prospective 
remembering. Findings of Chapter 3 indicate that there are two kinds of intention-superiority 
effects. An intention-superiority effect after intention formation might reflect processes 
related to encoding or planning, whereas the same phenomenon in a performance interval 
might reflect preparatory processes. If the former effect reflects planning processes, the size 
of this effect may depend on the complexity of the to-be-performed task. Thus far, lists of 
simple actions were used as study materials. Future research may manipulate complexity of 
prospective tasks directly. The number of items to be retained, familiarity of these items, and 
the kind of relations between them may influence planning processes (Ellis, 1996).  
Demonstrating an intention-superiority effect in a performance interval extends 
previous findings. The current findings support a monitoring view as proposed by Smith 
(2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004). Yet, demonstrating an intention-superiority effect prior task 
execution does not necessarily imply that this is an obligatory process for successful 
remembering (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). Instructions may have triggered reliance on more 
strategic processes. Several studies have demonstrated that stressing the importance of a 
prospective memory task relative to ongoing activities elicits more strategic monitoring 
processes, but prospective memory performance does not benefit from these strategic 
processes if the prospective task is rather simple (e.g., Einstein, et al., 2005; Kliegel, Martin, 
McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2004). In these studies 
participants were simply told which of the two experimental tasks, that is, the prospective 
task or the ongoing activity in which retrieval events were embedded, was more important. 
Similarly, we stressed the importance of the intended task by means of an outcome 
evaluation. Participants probably interpreted the postponed task as the primary task of the 
experiment, and may have relied on more strategic monitoring processes. Dockree and Ellis 
(2001) introduced prospective task with less emphasis. They asked participants to perform 
some actions under the guise of preparatory tasks for the next participant and demonstrated 
an intention-superiority effect immediately after intention formation. Whether an intention-
superiority effect prior task execution is observed remains to be tested.  
In the current research the size of the intention-superiority effect was not related to 
recall performance. Across all experiments the reported pattern of results did not change 
when participants with imperfect free recall performance were excluded. However, these 
participants remembered most actions in an unexpected free recall. In other words, their 
recall was still very good, so the statistical power would have been too low to test 
dependencies between activation and recall. Consequently, future research is needed to assess 
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the relation between activation and remembering. If the intention-superiority effect reflects 
the degree of preparatory or monitoring processes, we would expect a positive relationship 
between intention superiority and the number of recalled actions.  
Another question is what drives the intention-superiority effect. Our findings indicate 
that the strength of intent as well as the probability of a retrieval occasion contributes to the 
effect. Although our results do not support Freeman and Ellis (2003b) motor-code 
hypothesis, we cannot not exclude the possibility that the motor-related information is 
activated. Since study lists described simple, distinct activities, the materials we chose might 
have stimulated the encoding of motor-related information at study. Neuroimaging studies 
also indicate that motor regions are activated when an intention to do something is encoded 
(Leynes, Allen, & Marsh, 1998; Leynes, Marsh, Hicks, Allen, & Mayhorn, 2003). In 
addition, a simple motor interference task (drawing circles in the air) eliminates the intention-
superiority effect (Freeman & Ellis, 2003b, Experiment 4) and also decreases prospective 
memory performance (Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994). In sum, there is some evidence 
that motor information, or more general, planning processes contribute the intention-
superiority effect. However, an intention-superiority effect seems to be more than a 
prospective enactment effect. Announcing an outcome evaluation seems to strengthen 
different kinds of intentions. Future research could use this means to strengthen the 
commitment to more verbal tasks, for example giving a talk or pass on a message. If the 
intention-superiority effect reflects a heightened availability of information related to the 
action component we would expect a similar pattern of results as presented in this research.   
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Stimuli of the study lists that were used in the lexical-decision task are highlighted in 
italics. None of those words were highlighted on the original study lists. Each study list 
consisted of a title and four typical actions presented on a single sheet of paper. In 
Experiment 1 two of the three lists were used as study materials and words of the third lists 
served as distracter words together with the eight additional words. In Experiments 2-3 
participants always studied List A and B and words of List C served as distracter words. 
 
Study Lists 
 
List A (preparing chocolate candy): 
 
Schoko-Pralinen herstellen  
 
Die Kuvertüre schmelzen 
und den Zucker beigeben. 
Die Schokolade mit Buttercreme mischen. 
Dann kleine Kugeln gestalten. 
  
 
List B (mixing a cocktail): 
 
Einen Cocktail mixen  
 
Den Alkohol abmessen. 
Alles in den Shaker füllen. 
Mit beiden Händen kräftig schütteln 
und in ein Glas gießen. 
 
 
List C (cooking a sushi dish): 
 
Sushi kochen  
 
Den Reis kochen. 
Dann auf Algen verteilen, 
mit weiteren Zutaten belegen. 
und zu einer Rolle formen. 
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Additional words 
 
Verpackung  
entsorgen 
Bücher  
einsortieren 
Anleitung  
lesen 
Löcher  
bohren 
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Stimuli of the study lists used in the recognition task are highlighted in italics. None 
of those words were highlighted on the original study lists. Lists were labelled as List 1 or 
List 2. The overall topic (brewing coffee or making a sandwich) was not mentioned. 
 
Study Lists  
 
List A (brewing coffee): 
 
Den Kaffee kochen. 
Die Tasse hinstellen. 
Die Kanne nehmen. 
Die Milch eingießen. 
Den Zuckerwürfel reinwerfen. 
Das Getränk umrühren. 
 
List B (making a sandwich): 
 
Das Brötchen aufschneiden. 
Mit Butter bestreichen. 
Mit Käse belegen. 
Mit Salat bedecken. 
Mit Salz würzen. 
Das Sandwich zuklappen. 
 
 
Distracter stimuli used in Experiment 4-5 
 
Distracter stimuli related to brewing 
coffee: 
 
Kaffeepulver  
löffeln 
Filtertüte  
knicken 
Wasser  
eingießen 
aufschäumen 
Espresso 
 
Distracter stimuli related to making a 
sandwich: 
 
Weißbrot 
toasten  
Tomate 
zerteilen  
Salami  
abpellen 
Gurkenscheibe  
halbieren 
 
 
Distracter stimuli unrelated to study lists: 
 
Herd 
Topf  
Pfanne 
Folie 
auskratzen 
einfetten 
braten 
abreißen 
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Stimuli of the study lists used in the recognition task are highlighted in italics. None 
of those words were highlighted on the original study lists. Each list consisted of a title and 
eight actions. 
 
Study Lists  
 
List A (clearing away materials): 
 
Das Material weglegen 
 
Die CD in den Karton hineinlegen. 
Den Fragebogen ausfüllen, 
mit dem Tacker zusammenheften. 
Die Seiten lochen. 
Den Ordner holen, 
beim Trennstreifen aufschlagen. 
Den Fragebogen abheften. 
Den Ordner auf den Nebentisch stellen. 
List B (tidying up the desk): 
 
Den Tisch aufräumen 
 
Das Lehrbuch zuklappen. 
Den zerknitterten Zettel wegwerfen. 
Das Lineal wegräumen. 
Den Bleistift anspitzen. 
Den großen Umschlag öffnen. 
Das Schriftstück abstempeln, 
in die rote Ablage einsortieren. 
Die Tischfläche mit dem Lappen abwischen. 
 
Distracter stimuli used in Experiment 6 
 
Distracter stimuli related to the office 
context: 
 
Papierkorb 
Bürostuhl 
Textmarker 
Unterlagen 
Kopie 
Klebeband 
verstauen 
stapeln 
arbeiten 
abschreiben 
faxen 
tippen 
Distracter stimuli unrelated to the office 
context:  
 
Hammer 
Schlagzeug 
Schlüssel 
Aktentasche 
Teekanne 
Pfanne 
kochen 
abwischen 
streichen 
addieren 
auffalten 
braten 
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Prospective memory describes our ability to realize previously planned activities at an 
appropriate moment in the future. Remembering to keep an appointment, pay bills in time, or 
turn off the stove after cooking are prospective memory tasks that highlight the importance of 
this ability in everyday life. Prospective memory proceeds through several phases. Ellis 
(1996) distinguishes the phases of (a) intention formation and encoding, (b) intention 
retention, (c) a delayed intention retrieval, (d) intention execution, and (e) a final evaluation 
of the resultant outcome. A crucial aspect of prospective memory task is the self-initiated 
retrieval of the intention after a delay interval.  A specific situation (e.g., passing a letter box) 
must be recognized as an appropriate opportunity to intiiate a previously planned activity 
(e.g., to post a letter). There are no explict prompts to iniate retrieval processes. The mental 
representations of a prospective memory task consist of at least three components: the when 
(an retrieval cue to initiate the intention), what (the to-be-realized action), and the intent or 
decision to do something (Ellis, 1996). One possible mechanisms of successful prospective 
memory performance is that intention-relevant concepts are more easily accessible than other 
(long-term) memory contents during the delay between encoding and initiation of the 
intended activity (e.g., Ellis, 1996; Förster, et al., 2005; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Lewin, 
1926).  
Previous research on the formation, encoding and representation of delayed intentions 
found faster response latencies for stimuli associated with an activity that was going to be 
realized at some future moment compared to more neutral materials during a retention 
interval. Those studies used a postponed-intention paradigm in which latencies for nouns and 
verbs of two lists of simple actions (e.g., to take a cup) are compared. A so-called intention-
superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) reflects in faster response latencies for stimuli of 
the list of actions intended for future enactment relative to stimuli of the second, previously 
learned list of actions. Thus, an intention-superiority effect reflects the heightened activation 
or increased accessibility of information related to the action component of intentions. The 
current research consists of two series of experiments, related to the thus far rather neglected 
intent and the cue component, respectively.  
In a first series of experiments we focused on the role of the intent. Specifically, 
previous research on the intention-superiority effect reported faster latencies for reactions to 
stimuli intended for future enactment relative to stimuli associated with no enactment or 
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cancelled enactment. Previous attempts to demonstrate an intention-superiority effect for 
other types of tasks, for instance observing the experimenter executing actions, have not 
yielded an intention-superiority effect. A reason for this could be that the typical enactment 
task was associated with a higher degree of commitment than other laboratory-based tasks, 
and that task importance or its consequences heighten the accessibility of intention-relevant 
materials. In line with this reasoning we demonstrate in three experiments described in 
Chapter 2 an intention-superiority effect in a lexical-decision task for different types of 
intended activities (e.g., grading a written report) when task realization has personally 
relevant consequences in terms of a performance evaluation. In contrast, we found no 
intention-superiority effect when future enactment had no personally relevant consequences 
for participants. These findings imply that the intention-superiority effect is not restricted to 
to-be-executed actions, but generally occurs for relevant plans. 
In a second series of experiments we focused on the cue component. Goschke and 
Kuhl (1993) interpreted the intention-superiority effect in terms of a more persistent 
activation of intention-related materials. However, persistency of activation and proximity of 
retrieval opportunity have not been disentangled yet. Typically participants are instructed to 
realize the intention immediately after completing the task that assesses response latencies 
(e.g. a recognition test) and yields the intention-superiority effect. Thus, the response-latency 
task is also associated with a retrieval occasion in the near future. In Experiment 4 we 
manipulated whether a recognition test indicated a near retrieval opportunity or not. We 
observed an intention-superiority effect only if the task itself was a meaningful cue for a near 
retrieval opportunity. In Experiments 5-6 we manipulated the proximity of a retrieval 
opportunity within a recognition test. The intention-superiority effect was restricted to the 
first block after intention formation and the last block prior to intention realization, but was 
not found in centre blocks. All three experiments further demonstrated that the intention-
superiority effect is not restricted to future enactment tasks, but also found for monitoring 
tasks (replicating the findings of Chapter 2). In sum, these findings indicate that even short-
term delayed intentions are flexibly activated and deactivated depending on the proximity of 
a retrieval opportunity.      
 
 
(
(
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Der Begriff „Prospektives Gedächtnis“ beschreibt unsere Fähigkeit, Aufgaben im 
Voraus zu planen und sich dann später in einer geeigneten Situation selbstständig daran zu 
erinnern und auszuführen. Das Einhalten von Terminen, das rechtzeitige Bezahlen von 
Rechnungen, oder das Abschalten des Bügeleisens sind alltagsrelevante Beispiele 
prospektiver Gedächtnisaufgaben. Prospektives Erinnern ist ein aus mehreren Phasen 
bestehender Prozess. Ellis (1996) unterscheidet die Phasen (a) der Intentionsbildung und –
enkodierung, (b) der Intentionsspeicherung, (c) des zeitverzögerten Intentionsabrufs, (d) der 
planmäßigen Intentionsausführung, und (e) der abschließenden Bewertung des erreichten 
Zielzustands. Ein zentraler Aspekt prospektiver Gedächtnisaufgaben ist der selbstinitiierte 
Abruf der Intention nach einer zeitlichen Verzögerung. Eine bestimmte Situation (z.B. das 
Vorbeigehen am Briefkasten) muss selbstständig als eine geeignete Gelegenheit zur 
Intentionsausführung erkannt werden (z.B. um eine Postkarte abschicken). In der gegebenen 
Situation erfolgt keine explizite Aufforderung sich an den zuvor gefassten Plan zu erinnern. 
Die mentale Repräsentation einer Intention umfasst demnach mindestens drei Elemente: das 
wann (der Abrufkontext: eine geeignete Gelegenheit zum Abruf und Ausführen der 
Intention), das was (die intendierte Handlung) und das Fassen der Handlungsabsicht per se 
(Ellis, 1996). Einige Autoren nehmen an, dass diese intentionsrelevanten Informationen 
während des Verzögerungsintervalls zwischen Intentionsenkodierung und -initiierung leichter 
verfügbar sind als andere Gedächtnisinhalte (z.B. Ellis, 1996; Förster, et al., 2005; Goschke 
& Kuhl, 1993; Lewin, 1926). 
In bisherigen Untersuchungen zur Intentionsbildung, -enkodierung und -speicherung 
zeitverzögerter Intentionen zeigten sich während des Verzögerungsintervalls kürzere 
Reaktionszeiten für Stimuli, die mit einer zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt zu erledigenden 
Aufgabe verknüpft waren, im Vergleich zu neutraleren Stimuli. In dem zugrundeliegenden 
Paradigma werden Reaktionszeiten für Substantive und Verben von zwei zuvor gelernten 
Listen einfacher Handlungsanweisungen (z.B. die Tasse hinstellen) miteinander verglichen. 
Ein so genannter  Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) zeigt sich in einem 
Reaktionszeitvorteil für Handlungen, die zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt ausgeführt werden 
sollten, verglichen mit anderen ebenfalls kurz zuvor gelernten Handlungen. Dieser Effekt 
deutet auf eine höhere Aktivierung oder leichtere Verfügbarkeit von Informationen hin, 
welche sich auf die intendierte Handlung (das was-Element zeitverzögerter Intentionen) 
beziehen. Motivationale Faktoren, zum Beispiel die Relevanz der intendierten Aufgabe für 
die Teilnehmenden, sowie der Einfluss der zeitlichen Nähe einer geeigneten 
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Abrufgelegenheit auf die Verfügbarkeit intentionsrelevanter Informationen wurden in der 
Forschung zum Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt bisher kaum berücksichtigt. In der 
vorliegenden Arbeit werden zwei Serien von Experimenten vorgestellt, welche den Einfluss 
dieser bisher vernachlässigten Faktoren auf den Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt untersuchen.   
In einer ersten Serie von Experimenten wurde der Einfluss der Aufgabenrelevanz auf 
die Verfügbarkeit intentionsrelevanter Stimuli untersucht. Bisherige Befunde legten nahe, 
dass der Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt in laborbasierten Studien auf prospektive Aufgaben 
beschränkt ist, bei denen die Teilnehmenden beabsichtigten die Handlungen zu einem 
späteren Zeitpunkt aktiv auszuführen. Für andere prospektive Aufgaben (z.B. jemanden zu 
einem späteren Zeitpunkt bei der Handlungsausführung zu beobachten), konnte der Effekt 
bisher nicht repliziert werden. Eine Erklärung für dieses Ergebnismuster ist, dass die 
Instruktion zur  späteren Handlungsausführung von den Teilnehmenden als (selbst-) 
relevanter oder wichtiger wahrgenommen wird als die Instruktion zur späteren 
Handlungsbeobachtung. In drei Experimenten (Exp.1-3) wird ein 
Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt für verschiedene prospektive Aufgaben (z.B. das Benoten 
eines verbalen Gedächtnistests) in einer lexikalischen Entscheidungsaufgabe demonstriert, 
wenn die Aufgabenrealisierung mit für den Teilnehmenden relevanten Konsequenzen in 
Form einer Leistungsbewertung verknüpft war. Ein Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt trat nicht 
auf, falls das Ausführen der prospektiven Aufgabe keine relevanten Konsequenzen für den 
Teilnehmenden hatte (Exp. 3). Die Befunde legen nahe, dass der 
Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt nicht auf zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt aktiv auszuführende 
Handlungen beschränkt ist, sondern einen generellen Verfügbarkeitsvorteil für geplante 
Aufgaben darstellt.   
In einer zweiten Serie von Experimenten wurde der Einfluss der zeitlichen Nähe einer 
geeigneten Abrufgelegenheit auf den Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt untersucht. Goschke und 
Kuhl (1993) interpretierten den Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt im Sinne einer länger 
anhaltenden (persistierenden) Aktivierung intentionsrelevanter Informationen. In den meisten 
Studien konnte jedoch nicht zwischen einer persistierenden Aktivierung intentionsrelevanter 
Informationen nach der Intentionsenkodierung und einer möglichen Reaktivierung derselben 
in einem mit der Intention assoziierten Abrufkontexts unterschieden werden. Typischerweise 
wurden die Teilnehmenden aufgefordert, die intendierte Aufgabe (z.B. eine Reihe von 
Handlungen ausführen) unmittelbar nach Beenden derjenigen Aufgabe umzusetzen, in der die 
Reaktionszeiten zur Berechnung des Intentionsüberlegenheitseffektes erfasst wurden. Die 
Reaktionszeitaufgabe signalisierte demnach eine zeitlich nahe Abrufgelegenheit. In 
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Experiment 4 wurde manipuliert, ob der Beginn der Reaktionszeitaufgabe (ein 
Rekognitionstest) ein Hinweisreiz für eine zeitlich nahe Abrufgelegenheit war oder nicht. Es 
wurde nur dann ein Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt in der Reaktionszeitaufgabe beobachtet, 
wenn die Aufgabe auch eine zeitlich nahe Abrufgelegenheit signalisierte. In den folgenden 
zwei Experimenten (Exp. 5-6) wurde die zeitliche Nähe der Abrufgelegenheit innerhalb des 
Rekognitionstests manipuliert. Der Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt war auf bestimmte 
Abschnitte des Rekognitionstests beschränkt. Es wurde ein Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt in 
einem kurzen Intervall unmittelbar nach der Intentionsenkodierung beobachtet sowie in 
einem späteren Intervall, nachdem ein Hinweisreiz eine zeitlich nahe Abrufgelegenheit 
signalisiert hatte. In anderen Abschnitten des Rekognitionstests wurde kein Effekt gefunden. 
Die Befunde aus der ersten Serie von Experimenten replizierend, konnte der 
Intentionsüberlegenheitseffekt in allen drei Experimenten sowohl für eine 
Handlungsintention als auch eine Beobachtungsintention gezeigt werden. Die Befunde legen 
nahe, dass Intentionen, deren Realisierung momentan nicht möglich ist, in Abhängigkeit von 
der Nähe einer Gelegenheit zur Intentionsrealisierung flexibel aktiviert und deaktiviert 
werden.  
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